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AFTER IQBAL
Joseph A. Seiner*
From the viewpoint of absolute truth, what we feel and
experience in our ordinary daily life is all delusion. Of all the
various delusions, the sense of discrimination between oneself
and others is the worst form, as it creates nothing but
unpleasantness for both sides.
-Dalai Lama
INTRODUCTION
Henry David Thoreau wrote in Walden that "[ilt is never too
late to give up our prejudices."2 The Supreme Court's decision late
last term in Ashcroft v. Iqbal' may have made it easier for those
prejudices to exist unchallenged. The decision extends the
controversial holding of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly'-that a
plaintiffs allegations must state a plausible claim to avoid
dismissal'-to all civil cases, including "antitrust and
discrimination suits alike."6 The Iqbal decision thus resolves the
debate as to whether the Twombly plausibility standard is limited to
the antitrust context where it arose, making clear that the standard
applies to all civil matters, including employment-discrimination
cases.' Indeed, recent research suggests that the plausibility test is
* Joseph Seiner is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of
South Carolina School of Law. The author would like to thank Benjamin
Gutman and Daniel Vail for their generous assistance with this Article. The
author would also like to thank Joe Cecil and the Federal Judicial Center for
assisting with the study outlined in this Article. This Article was presented at
the Washington and Lee University School of Law and at the Fourth Annual
Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law at the Seton
Hall University School of Law, where the author received valuable feedback.
This Article also greatly benefited from the excellent editorial skills of the
author's loving wife, Megan Seiner. Any errors, miscalculations, or
misstatements are entirely those of the author.
1. MATYHEw E. BUNsON, THE WISDOM TEACHINGS OF THE DALAI LAMA 31
(1997).
2. HENRY D. THOREAU, WALDEN 8 (J. Lyndon Shanley ed., Princeton Univ.
Press 1971) (1854).
3. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
4. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
5. Id. at 557.
6. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
7. See Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on
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already being used by some lower courts to dismiss workplace
claims.8
The plausibility standard announced in Twombly and confirmed
by Iqbal replaces the more relaxed test from Conley v. Gibson," that
a complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief."'0 This "no set of facts" language
from Conley governed federal pleading for fifty years until the recent
Supreme Court cases abrogated the decision and required plaintiffs
to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim." While Twombly
and Iqbal have significantly changed the pleading rules for all civil
cases, these recent decisions provide little guidance regarding what
must be alleged to sufficiently state a claim of employment
discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VI").1
Nevertheless, Iqbal does help clarify Twombly on the question
of intent and explains that discriminatory intent cannot be alleged
"generally" but must instead be alleged in the proper factual
context. Similarly, Iqbal warns against making conclusory
statements when attempting to allege that the defendant's
discriminatory intent is plausible. 14 Iqbal provides that plausibility
"is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."" This
Article attempts to pinpoint exactly where plausibility falls in that
the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1811, 1814-15 (2008) (acknowledging the argument that Twombly
only applies to antitrust cases, but noting that district courts have applied
Twombly much more broadly).
8. Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011,
1014, 1035-38 (2009) (discussing a study that "revealed that the lower courts
are unquestionably using the new [Twombly] plausibility standard to dismiss
Title VII claims") (copyright to the University of Illinois Law Review is held by
the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois).
9. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
10. Id. at 45-46.
11. See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Scott
Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 135, 135 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php
?s=inbrief&p=2007/07/09/dodson ("[Twombly] gutted the venerable language
from Conley v. Gibson that every civil procedure professor and student can
recite almost by heart: that 'a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle[] him to relief.'").
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2006).
13. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 ("[Tlhe Federal Rules do not require courts to
credit a complaint's conclusory statements without reference to its factual
context.").
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1949 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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gray area between possible and probable when alleging
discriminatory intent in an employment case brought pursuant to
Title VII.
I was recently able to review substantial data suggesting that
employment discrimination continues to flourish in our society. 16
The statistical data strongly suggest that an allegation of
discriminatory intent in the employment context is far more
plausible on its face than the relatively more dubious factual
allegations set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. Simply put, it is far
more plausible that an employer has intended to discriminate
against one of its workers than that a high-level governmental
conspiracy has been carried out or that major corporations have
engaged in a complex antitrust scheme." Thus, an allegation of
discriminatory intent in the workplace setting, made with proper
factual support that is distinct from the allegations of Twombly and
Iqbal, states a plausible Title VII claim.
Based on the research reviewed, this Article formulates an
analytical framework for alleging discriminatory intent in the Title
VII context. My prior articles have argued for a unified pleading
standard for Title VII18 and disability cases 9 in light of Twombly.
However, I am not aware of any article proposing a uniform
pleading framework for alleging discriminatory intent in Title VII
cases after Iqbal, and this Article attempts to fill that substantial
void in the academic scholarship.20 This Article navigates the
nuances of the recent Twombly and Iqbal decisions and provides an
analytical framework for asserting the essential facts of a Title VII
claim. This Article should serve as a blueprint for courts and
litigants when evaluating an employment-discrimination case and
will hopefully prevent years of needless litigation over what
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part II.C-D (discussing the facts of the Twombly and Iqbal
Supreme Court decisions).
18. See generally Seiner, supra note 8, at 1015 (arguing for a unified
pleading standard for Title VII claims).
19. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95
(2010) (arguing for a uniform pleading standard for claims brought under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), addressing the implications of the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions on disability claims, and discussing the potential
impact of Iqbal on pleading discriminatory intent in ADA cases).
20. It is worth noting that my prior scholarship has focused on the Title VII
implications of the Twombly plausibility standard, and I proposed a Title VII
pleading model following that decision. See generally Seiner, supra note 8.
Similarly, I have explored the ADA implications of both Twombly and Iqbal,
and proposed a pleading framework for disability-discrimination claims. See
generally Seiner, supra note 19. This Article builds off of my prior work and
analyzes pleading discriminatory intent following the Iqbal decision. While this
Article performs an extensive analysis of various studies addressing workplace
discrimination, I would refer the reader to my prior work for a more complete
understanding of how the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standards have
changed the face of pleading employment-discrimination claims.
20101 181
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plausibility means when alleging discriminatory intent in the
employment setting.
This Article begins by explaining the pleading requirements of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 1 Next, this Article explores
how Supreme Court case law has shaped those rules, emphasizing
the Court's recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.22 Then, this
Article outlines the results of numerous research studies that
examine the current state of employment discrimination in our
society.21 Building on this research, this Article proposes a unified
analytical framework for pleading intent in employment-
discrimination claims brought under Title VII.2 ' The Article then
explains how the proposed pleading model comports with the federal
rules, as interpreted by Twombly and Iqbal. The Article concludes
by examining the possible implications of adopting the proposed
pleading framework.25
I. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The pleading standards in federal employment-discrimination
cases are governed by the same Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("FRCP") that apply to other civil causes of action.26 FRCP 12(b)(6)
allows a defendant to move for the dismissal of a complaint for
"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."2 7  To
state a sufficient claim and avoid a 12(b)(6) dismissal, an
employment-discrimination plaintiff must satisfy FRCP 8(a)(2),
which requires a complaint to include "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.""
The sample pleading forms attached to the federal rules help
clarify the pleading requirements by providing an example of a
sufficient complaint. 29 Form 11 thus provides the following example
of an adequate allegation of negligence:
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Parts II-III.
23. See infra Parts IV-V.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. See infra Part VII.
26. See, e.g., Susan K Grebeldinger, How Can a Plaintiff Prove Intentional
Employment Discrimination if She Cannot Explore the Relevant Circumstances:
The Need for Broad Workforce and Time Parameters in Discovery, 74 DENV. U.
L. REV. 159, 170 (1996) (noting that federal rules "govern the discovery process
for employment discrimination cases brought in the federal courts"); Ronald A.
Schmidt, Note, The Plaintiffs Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases:
Discrimination Vel Non-St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993), 73 NEB. L. REV. 953, 955 n.8 (1993) ("The Supreme Court has frequently
stated its intention to subject civil rights litigation to the same procedural rules
as all other civil litigation in the federal courts.").
27. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
28. Id. 8(a)(2).
29. Id. Form 11.
182 [Vol. 45
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On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against the plaintiff.30
These rules are therefore relatively straightforward. Pursuant
to Rule 8, a complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of
the claim."3 ' According to the sample pleading form, this short and
plain statement would include the date, place, and nature of the
alleged violation, as well as the actor(s) involved.32 If the complaint
fails to allege these minimum requirements, the case is subject to
dismissal. Though the federal pleading rules are simple on their
face, recent Supreme Court decisions have taken some of the
certainty out of these seemingly clear-cut requirements.
II. SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Conley v. Gibson
One of the earliest cases addressing the federal pleading
requirements, Conley v. Gibson," provided a straightforward
standard for litigants to follow. 35  In Conley, the Supreme Court
addressed the sufficiency of a complaint alleging a civil-rights
violation.3 6  The Court noted that when considering a plaintiffs
allegations, a court should apply "the accepted rule that a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief."31 In announcing this
test, the Court emphasized that navigating the federal pleading
rules was not meant to be "a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive to the outcome" and emphasized that "the
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.""
Over the next five decades, the Conley "no set of facts" language
became the relevant inquiry of any federal court addressing a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.39  During that time, a plaintiffs civil
30. Id. It is worth noting that Twombly discusses the sample negligence
form with approval (in its previous Form 9 version). See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
32. Id. Form 11.
33. Id. 12(b)(6).
34. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
35. See id.; Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing After Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 21 (2008) ("Conley's 'no set of facts' language,
at least if read literally, represented an endorsement of 'notice' pleading in its
least demanding form."); see also Seiner, supra note 19, at 99; Seiner, supra
note 8, at 1017-19.
36. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 41.
37. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 48.
39. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of
Court Access, 84 IOWA L. REV. 873, 880 (2009) ("Notice pleading proponents
focus their concern on Twombly's treatment of language in Conley quoted for
2010] 183
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complaint was not subject to dismissal unless it was "beyond doubt"
that the plaintiff would be unable to produce sufficient facts to
support the viable allegations in the complaint.40 This so-called
notice-pleading standard placed a very minimal requirement on
plaintiffs, who were only required to give the defendant basic notice
of the claim.4 1 This would all change, however, when the Supreme
Court reassessed this standard fifty years later in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly.42
B. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.
Although it was decided prior to Twombly, Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A. provided the Supreme Court's best explanation of the
pleading standards for employment-discrimination cases.43 In
Swierkiewicz, the Court considered a claim brought by a fifty-three-
year-old native of Hungary who alleged that his employer had
terminated him because of his race and age in violation of Title VII
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA").44
In upholding the plaintiff's complaint in the case, the Court
concluded that an employment-discrimination litigant need not
plead a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to
fifty years as the key statement of the notice pleading standard: 'a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.'").
40. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading
Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 111 (2009) ("Taken to its literal extreme,
Conley thus seems to say that the mere pleading of a viable theory of recovery is
sufficient to state a claim, so long as there is some possible set of facts that
could be proved in support of that claim.").
41. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431,
435 (2008) ("Conley laid the foundation for pleading doctrine, affirming that the
new regime imposed by the Federal Rules left only the notice-giving function
intact. Although such notice had to include both the nature of the claim and the
grounds upon which it rests, the Court definitively stated that 'the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts
upon which he bases his claim.'"); see also Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the
Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D.
604, 604 (2007) ("In theory, pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
plays a minor part in the litigation process. The complaint opens the door to
that process by crossing a relatively low bar and thereafter plays but a minimal
role in the ultimate resolution of the controversy. But anyone who practices in
federal court knows that the reality is somewhat different.").
42. 550 U.S. 544, 554-63 (2007).
43. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Seiner, supra note 8,
at 1019-21. See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81
TEX. L. REV. 551, 573 (2002) (discussing the Swierkiewicz holding and noting
that "the Court focused on the law of Title VII, the Court's own precedent, and
the Federal Rules rubric").
44. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508-09.
184 [Vol. 45
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dismiss. Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, a prima facie
case of employment discrimination is established by showing that
the plaintiff is part of a protected class, that the plaintiff is qualified
for the position, that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment
action, and that there is other evidence giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. The Court emphasized that the McDonnell
Douglas test is only "an evidentiary standard" and does not
represent a "pleading requirement."48
The Swierkiewicz Court stated that under the notice-pleading
framework of the federal rules, it is too burdensome to require a
plaintiff to plead all of the facts establishing a McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case, particularly when the McDonnell Douglas test is
not even applicable to every case involving discrimination. 49 And, as
discovery often "unearth[s] relevant facts and evidence," the prima
facie case should be flexible and "not .. . transposed into a rigid
pleading standard for discrimination cases."o The Court
emphasized that under Conley, the plaintiff need only give the
opposing party "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."51 The Court further pointed out that
under a notice-pleading framework, "liberal discovery rules and
summary judgment motions" must be used "to define disputed facts
and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims."52 This system
allows the parties to "focus litigation on the merits of a claim," and
vague or unmeritorious claims can be addressed by the defendant
through a motion for a definite statement or a motion for summary
judgment.1 Thus, Swierkiewicz emphasized that the liberal
pleading standard set forth in Conley applies to employment-
discrimination claims and that such suits are not subject to a
"heightened pleading standard."54
45. Id. at 510-11. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had been
terminated on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII and on
account of his age in violation of the ADEA. His complaint detailed the events
leading to his termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and
nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his
termination. Id. at 514. This complaint gave the defendant "fair notice" of the
claims against it. Id.
46. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47. Id. at 802; see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d
840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework).
48. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510.
49. Id. at 511.
50. Id. at 512.
51. Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 514-15. See Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence:
Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 1315, 1356
(2008) ("[Tlhe liberal approach to pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, particularly as it has been applied to the civil rights and
employment discrimination contexts, makes it possible for victims of
20101 185
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C. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court reassessed the
federal pleading requirements in a complex antitrust case brought
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. In Twombly, the plaintiffs
alleged that several regional telephone companies had "conspired to
restrain trade" which resulted in "inflat[ed] charges for local
telephone and high-speed Internet services." 6  The purported
conspiracy between the phone companies allegedly consisted of both
improper "parallel conduct" which prohibited the development of
potential competitors and improper agreements by the companies
not to compete with each other.
In addressing the plaintiffs' allegations, the Court noted that
the "no set of facts" standard from Conley had often "been
questioned, criticized, and explained away."58  Thus, as this
language had been "puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous
observation has earned its retirement." 9 The Conley "no set of
facts" language should therefore be "forgotten.,6 0  In place of the
Conley standard, the Court imposed a "plausibility" requirement for
pleading a federal claim.6 1
According to the Court, a plausible claim does "not require
heightened fact pleading of specifics." 62  However, the plausibility
standard "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do."" Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must
allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face."" In this regard, there must be sufficient facts set forth in the
complaint "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on
the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact)." In the case at issue, the plaintiffs had
not sufficiently "nudged their claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible," and the Court therefore dismissed the complaint.6 6
In Twombly, then, the Court moved away from the notice-
pleading paradigm of Conley where the plaintiff was only required
discrimination to have access to discovery before specific facts giving rise to a
claim of discrimination can be articulated.").
55. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
56. Id. at 550.
57. Id. at 550-51.
58. Id. at 562.
59. Id. at 563.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 557.
62. Id. at 570.
63. Id. at 555.
64. Id. at 570.
65. Id.
66. Id.
186 [Vol. 45
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to give the defendant basic notice of the claim.67 In its place, the
Court now specifically requires plaintiffs to plead facts in their
complaints. 8 Plaintiffs must set forth sufficient facts to state a
plausible claim or face dismissal of the case.69
Studies have already suggested that the Twombly plausibility
standard has had a substantial impact in the civil-rights and
employment settings.7 0 A higher percentage of federal district court
opinions relying on Twombly have granted a motion to dismiss in
the employment-discrimination context than those earlier decisions
that relied on Conley.7' This is true for cases brought under Title
VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, as well as the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), which prohibits disability
discrimination.
Until recently, there was considerable debate as to whether the
lower courts should even apply the Twombly standard to cases
outside of the antitrust setting where the case arose.74 In Ashcroft v.
67. Cf Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); see also Saritha
Komatireddy Tice, Recent Developments: A "Plausible" Explanation of Pleading
Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 827, 833 (2008) ("The Court's decision in Twombly reflects a
growing hostility toward litigation and a definite shift away from Conley's
litigation-promoting mindset.").
68. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56.
69. Id. at 570.
70. See Hannon, supra note 7, at 1815 ("The rate of dismissal in civil rights
cases has spiked in the four months since Twombly."); Seiner, supra note 8, at
1014, 1027-38 (discussing a study that "revealed that the lower courts are
unquestionably using the new [Twombly] plausibility standard to dismiss Title
VII claims"); see also Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now
Unconstitutional, 92 MiNN. L. REV. 1851, 1853 (2008) ("Now, courts can more
easily dismiss any case upon a motion to dismiss."). See generally Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically, 59
Ai. U. L. REV. 553 (2010) (performing empirical analysis of dismissals after
Twombly and Iqbal based on various claim types).
71. See Seiner, supra note 8, at 1014, 1027-38 (discussing the results of one
study, noting the use of the Twombly plausibility standard to dismiss Title VII
claims, and discussing case analysis of the issue); Seiner, supra note 19 at 117-
26 (discussing a study of federal district court opinions in ADA cases). Both
motion-to-dismiss studies compared district court opinions issued the year
before Twombly that relied on Conley to district court opinions issued the year
following Twombly that relied on Twombly.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . .. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
73. See Seiner, supra note 19, at 117-26; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1014;
Nathan Koppel, Job-Discrimination Cases Tend to Fare Poorly in Federal Court,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A16 ("[Flederal judges also now routinely
terminate employment-discrimination cases through motions to dismiss.").
74. See Hannon, supra note 7, at 1814-15 (discussing the breadth of the
Twombly plausibility standard); see also Seiner supra note 19, at 101 n.54, 121-
2010] AFTER IQBAL 187
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Iqbal, the Supreme Court definitively resolved this debate and
refused to limit the Twombly plausibility standard to Sherman Act
cases.
D. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reassessed the breadth of the
plausibility standard that it had announced two years earlier in
Twombly." In the Iqbal case, Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim and Pakistani
citizen, was arrested in the United States after September 11, 2001,
on immigration-related charges. 76 Because he was deemed to be "of
high interest" to the ongoing investigation of the events of
September 11th, Iqbal was housed in a maximum-security
environment where he was held in lockdown for twenty-three hours
a day." - After pleading guilty to various criminal charges, Iqbal
spent time in prison and was subsequently sent to Pakistan." In
light of perceived constitutional violations during his confinement,"
Iqbal filed a Bivens action in federal court against various officials,
including former Attorney General John Ashcroft and Robert
Mueller, the Director of the FBI.o Iqbal alleged that Ashcroft and
Mueller "adopted an unconstitutional policy" on the basis of race,
religion, or national origin, which resulted in his being subjected to
poor prison conditions.8' Specifically, the complaint alleged
that petitioners designated respondent a person of high
interest on account of his race, religion, or national origin, in
contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution. . . . "[T]he [FBI], under the direction of
Defendant Mueller, arrested and detained thousands of Arab
Muslim men . .. as part of its investigation of the events of
September 11 . . .. [T]he policy of holding post-September-11th
detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until
they were 'cleared' by the FBI was approved by Defendants
Ashcroft and Mueller in discussions in the weeks after
September 11, 2001 . . . ." [Pletitioners "each knew of,
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject"
22; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1014.
75. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). See generally Seiner,
supra note 19 (discussing the Iqbal decision).
76. 129 S. Ct. at 1942-43.
77. Id. at 1943.
78. Id.
79. The Court noted that a number of the alleged violations were not before
it on appeal, including that "jailors 'kicked [Iqball in the stomach, punched him
in the face, and dragged him across' his cell without justification, . . . subjected
him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no safety risk to
himself or others,.. . and refused to let him and other Muslims pray because
there would be 'In]o prayers for terrorists.'" Id. at 1943-44.
80. Id. at 1942-43.
81. Id. at 1942.
188 [Vol. 45
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respondent to harsh conditions of confinement "as a matter of
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national
origin and for no legitimate penological interest." 2
Quoting Conley's "no set of facts" language, the federal district
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case for failure to
state a claim.83 While an appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Twombly abrogating the Conley standard.84
Applying Twombly's plausibility standard, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit upheld the district court decision, finding that
Iqbal's complaint sufficiently set forth the defendants' "personal
involvement in discriminatory decisions which, if true, violated
clearly established constitutional law."8
In considering the case, the Supreme Court initially determined
that the district court properly had jurisdiction to consider the
matter. 6  The Court then discussed the elements of a successful
Bivens claim, which, under the First and Fifth Amendments,
requires the plaintiff to plead "that the defendant acted with
discriminatory purpose."" Thus, Iqbal had to establish that the
defendants put the questioned policies in place "not for a neutral,
investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on
account of race, religion or national origin."88 Citing Twombly, the
Court noted that the federal rules do not mandate "detailed factual
allegations," but they do require "more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."89  Therefore, a
complaint will be held inadequate where it relies on "'naked
assertion[s]' that are 'devoid of further factual enhancement."'90
The Court also reiterated the plausibility standard announced in
Twombly, noting that a complaint is plausible where it includes
sufficient facts to permit the court to make a "reasonable inference"
that the defendant is responsible for the unlawful conduct.9'
In applying the Twombly standard to the case, the Court
concluded that Iqbal's allegations had 'not nudged [his] claims' of
invidious discrimination 'across the line from conceivable to
plausible."'92 In particular, Iqbal's assertions regarding Mueller and
82. Id. at 1944 (quoting Complaint at 1 96).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1946.
87. Id. at 1948-49.
88. Id. The Court rejected the plaintiffs supervisory-liability theory,
concluding that "[albsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her
title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Id. at 1949.
89. Id. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
90. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
91. Id. The Court noted that plausibility "is not akin to a 'probability
requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
92. Id. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
2010] 189
HeinOnline  -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 189 2010
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Ashcroft's alleged involvement in the discriminatory policy were too
"conclusory."93  Thus, "the conclusory nature of respondent's
allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature ...
disentitles them to the presumption of truth."9 Additionally, as the
Court found that there was a nondiscriminatory explanation for the
government's policies that were put in place after September 11th
that was "more likely" than Iqbal's assertions, the plaintiff failed to
plausibly state a claim for discrimination. In this regard, the
arrests that the FBI director supervised were probably permissible
and "justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who
were illegally present in the United States and who had potential
connections to those who committed terrorist acts."" The Court
further concluded that there was nothing in the complaint that
established that the defendants "housed detainees ... due to their
race, religion, or national origin. "97 Rather, all the complaint
suggested was that high-ranking officials, "in the aftermath of a
devastating terrorist attack," attempted to house "suspected
terrorists in the most secure conditions available."98 Due to the
inadequate and conclusory nature of his allegations, then, Iqbal's
complaint failed to plausibly state a claim for discrimination and
was rejected by the Court."
After rejecting the sufficiency of Iqbal's factual assertions in the
complaint, the Court also addressed-and rejected-Iqbal's legal
arguments. 00 First, the Court refused to restrict the Twombly
plausibility standard to antitrust claims.1o' Rather, the Court
concluded that this standard should apply to "all civil actions,"
including "antitrust and discrimination suits alike."0 2  This
significant holding firmly resolved considerable controversy over the
issue of the breadth of the Twombly standard, and it is now clear
that the plausibility test should apply to all civil claims. 103
Second, the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
FRCP 8 motion-to-dismiss standard should be "tempered" by a
"careful case-management approach" to discovery utilized by the
lower courts.104  Thus, the plausibility standard should not be
relaxed even where the lower courts assure the litigants "minimally
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1952.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1952-54.
101. Id. at 1953.
102. Id.
103. See Hannon, supra note 7, at 1814-15 (discussing the debate over how
broadly the Twombly standard applies).
104. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
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intrusive discovery.""' The Court found this particularly true in
litigation involving government officials, as such officials must be
able "to devote time to [their] duties," and litigation would present a
"substantial diversion" from these efforts. 06
Finally, the Court rejected Iqbal's argument that discriminatory
intent can be alleged "generally."' 7 The Court therefore found no
merit in the argument that a complaint that alleges that a
defendant discriminated against the plaintiff "on account of [his]
religion, race, and/or national origin" is sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss.'08 In rejecting this argument, the Court noted
that "the Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint's
conclusory statements without reference to its factual context." 109
The Court thus concluded that the FRCP did not permit Iqbal to
allege the "bare elements" of his claim and still survive dismissal."0
In sum, the Court rejected Iqbal's assertions that his complaint
satisfied the pleading requirements of the federal rules, as it
"fail[ed] to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and
unlawful discrimination.""'
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, dissented from the majority opinion.112 The dissent noted
that at this early stage of the litigation, the allegations in the
complaint must be taken as true, regardless of whether the
allegations make the Court "skeptical."" The dissent argued that if
the allegations in the complaint were true, the defendants were at
least "aware of the discriminatory policy being implemented and
deliberately indifferent to it.,,"4  And, because Iqbal's complaint
contained several "allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to the
discriminatory practices of their subordinates," the complaint
satisfied the Twombly standard."' The dissent therefore would
have upheld the sufficiency of Iqbal's complaint, and these Justices
found "no principled basis for the majority's disregard of the
allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to their subordinates'
discrimination."'16
105. Id. at 1953-54.
106. Id. at 1953.
107. Id. at 1954.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1959.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1960-61.
116. Id.
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III. LESSONS FROM SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal
have left the requirements for pleading intentional employment-
discrimination claims in disarray, and the proposed pleading
framework outlined in this Article attempts to provide some clarity
to this area of the law." The recent Supreme Court decisions took
the clear, straightforward pleading standard set forth in Conley and
replaced it with a much more amorphous plausibility requirement.118
Despite the lack of clarity in its decisions, the Court's recent cases
do provide some guidance that can be imported to employment-
discrimination claims and the proposed pleading framework
discussed in this Article.
A. Guidance from Decisions
From Swierkiewicz, we know that an employment-
discrimination plaintiff need not plead all of the elements of a prima
facie case of discrimination."' Thus, the plaintiff need not assert all
of the components of the McDonnell Douglas framework in the
complaint to sufficiently allege a claim of employment
discrimination.120  Therefore, if Swierkiewicz is still good law, 12 1
something less than a prima facie case of discrimination can be set
forth in a Title VII complaint and still satisfy FRCP 8(a).'22
Twombly provides some clarity on what that "something less" is,
specifically, a plaintiff must set forth sufficient facts in the
complaint to state a plausible claim of discrimination.'2 ' Plausibility
does not "require heightened fact pleading of specifics"; however,
117. See infra Part VI (offering a proposed pleading framework for alleging
discriminatory intent pursuant to Title VII); see also Lee Goldman, Trouble for
Private Enforcement of the Sherman Act: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and
the Oligopoly Problem, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1057, 1066 (2008) ("Courts and
commentators decried the Twombly opinion as creating substantial confusion.");
A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52
How. L.J. 99, 102 (2008) ("Twombly is a confusing opinion subject to multiple
interpretations whose implications are still being worked out.").
118. Spencer, supra note 117, at 160 (referencing Twombly's "amorphous
concept of 'plausibility'").
119. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002).
120. See id. The McDonnell Douglas test requires the plaintiff to show that
she is a member of a protected class, that she is qualified, that she suffered an
adverse employment action, and that there is other evidence giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. Id. at 510.
121. See infra Part III.B (discussing the viability of the Swierkiewicz
decision).
122. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-11.
123. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007); see also Seiner,
supra note 8, at 1042.
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there must be sufficient facts set forth in a Title VII complaint to
make it more than simply "speculative."124 Thus, Twombly teaches
us that an employment-discrimination plaintiff cannot rely on a
conclusory, "formulaic recitation" of the basic components of a Title
VII case.125
Twombly makes clear that a Title VII plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim, and Iqbal confirms this
standard. 2 ' Indeed, Iqbal resolves any doubt that the plausibility
standard extends beyond Sherman Act cases, as the standard is
applicable to "all civil actions," including "antitrust and
discrimination suits alike." 27 Iqbal provides that conclusory, "naked
assertion[s]" and "unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation[s]" must fail. 2 8 And, perhaps most importantly, Iqbal
offers some guidance on pleading discriminatory intent, which
cannot be alleged "generally."129  Thus, conclusory statements
regarding intent will not suffice, and an allegation of discriminatory
intent must be considered with "reference to its factual context.""o
In sum, Iqbal confirms the validity of the plausibility standard
announced in Twombly, clarifies that this standard applies to all
civil cases, and explains what is necessary to allege discriminatory
intent."'
B. The Fate of Swierkiewicz
It is worth considering that there may be serious concern
following Iqbal as to the validity of the Swierkiewicz decision.132
After all, Swierkiewicz cites to Conley three times and notes that
"conclusory allegations of discrimination" can be permitted to
proceed in an employment case. " Iqbal, which confirms the
124. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
125. Id. at 555.
126. Id.; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009).
127. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953; see Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly,
Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 481 (2010) ("In light of Iqbal, and short
of an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or legislative action,
Twombly is here to stay across the broad range of federal civil actions.").
128. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
129. Id. at 1954.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure & Federal Courts Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2009/05/beyond-twombly-by-prof-scott
-dodson.html (May 18, 2009) (noting that Iqbal "did not cite to Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N. A., a discrimination case that may now be effectively overruled");
Seiner, supra note 19, at 103-04 (discussing confusion surrounding the
Swierkiewicz decision after Twombly and Iqbal); Seiner, supra note 8
(discussing the Swierkiewicz decision in light of Twombly).
133. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 514-15 (2002).
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abrogation of the Conley standard, specifically rejects the argument
that "mere conclusory statements" may be used to support a
complaint.'14 And, the Iqbal decision does not cite to Swierkiewicz a
single time."a5 Thus, a strong argument can be made that Iqbal runs
counter to (and implicitly overrules) Swierkiewicz,"6 and the lower
courts have already taken varying approaches to this issue.13 7
While there may be some legitimate concern about the validity
of Swierkiewicz generally, the decision should be considered good
law at least as to cases brought under Title VII."" The decision
plainly states the standard for pleading employment-discrimination
cases and makes clear that a plaintiff need not allege a prima facie
case to sufficiently state a Title VII claim. '39 And while Iqbal does
not endorse the Swierkiewicz decision, it does not expressly overrule
it-nor does it express any opinion about the decision whatsoever.'40
Moreover, even the recent Twombly decision cites to Swierkiewicz
with approval.' Notably, the Twombly Court explains how its
134. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940, 1944, 1949.
135. See id. at 1937; Posting of Scott Dodson, supra note 132.
136. See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion
to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, (Ill. Pub. L. Research Paper No. 09-16),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1494683 (questioning the viability of the
Swierkiewicz decision following Twombly and Iqbal); cf A. Benjamin Spencer,
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) ("Twombly
appeared to be a departure from the simple 'notice' pleading standard
announced in Conley.. . and reaffirmed most notably in ... Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema.").
137. Compare, e.g., al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009) ("In
Twombly, the Supreme Court.. . reaffirmed the holding of Swierkiewicz ...
rejecting a fact pleading requirement for Title VII employment discrimination"),
with Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) ("We have to
conclude, therefore, that because Conley has been specifically repudiated by
both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it concerns
pleading requirements and relies on Conley.").
138. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010), (manuscript at 57-58), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1442786 ("And courts must remain cognizant of their obligation to
avoid conflicts with either binding positive law (such as the Federal Rules and
their Forms) or precedent that has yet to be overruled (such as Swierkiewicz).").
139. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002).
140. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937; Seiner, supra note 19, at 103 (discussing
Twombly's citation to Swierkiewicz and Iqbal's failure to cite the decision).
141. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 563, 569 n.14, 570
(2006). Similarly, in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), a decision issued
shortly after Twombly, the Supreme Court also cited to Swierkiewicz with
approval. Id. at 93-94; see also Bone, supra note 39, at 886 n.68 ("The Twombly
Court also approved its previous decision in Swierkiewicz."); Seiner, supra note
19, at 103 ("Bell Atlantic cites Swierkiewicz with approval."); Douglas G. Smith,
The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1087 (2009) ("[Tlhe majority
in Twombly repeatedly relied upon Swierkiewicz in its opinion. The majority
did not see anything inconsistent in its ruling and the Swierkiewicz decision.
Nor did it indicate that Swierkiewicz imposed any limitations on the scope of its
decision.").
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decision is distinguishable from Swierkiewicz rather than choosing
to overrule the decision. 4 2  Thus, it is somewhat premature to
forecast the demise of Swierkiewicz, whose holding should continue
to apply to Title VII cases. This is particularly true given the
unique role of summary judgment in employment-discrimination
matters, which is discussed in greater detail below.'13 Nonetheless,
Swierkiewicz must now be viewed under the more restrictive lens of
Twombly and Iqbal, and plaintiffs must make sure to plead
sufficient (and plausible) facts to satisfy all three decisions.
IV. PLEADING DISCRIMINATORY INTENT AFTER IQBAL-STUDIES ON
DISCRIMINATION
Swierkiewicz, Twombly, and Iqbal have clouded the pleading
requirements for employment-discrimination claims. In my
previous analyses, I have argued for a unified pleading standard for
cases brought under Title VII and the ADA.'" Such a unified
standard would provide clarity to this area of the law and help
litigants and the courts in assessing the validity of their cases. The
recent Iqbal decision has muddied the waters, however, on the
question of what a Title VII plaintiff must allege to plausibly plead
intent in an employment-discrimination case. Notably, after Iqbal,
intent cannot be alleged "generally" or with conclusory statements,
and an allegation of discriminatory intent must be considered with
"reference to its factual context."
Proving intent in an employment-discrimination case is
certainly a tricky endeavor,'4 and pleading intent after Iqbal may
142. In relevant part, Twombly states:
Even though Swierkiewicz's pleadings "detailed the events leading to
his termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and
nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his
termination," the Court of Appeals dismissed his complaint for failing
to allege certain additional facts that Swierkiewicz would need at the
trial stage to support his claim in the absence of direct evidence of
discrimination. We reversed on the ground that the Court of Appeals
had impermissibly applied what amounted to a heightened pleading
requirement by insisting that Swierkiewicz allege "specific facts"
beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing
entitlement to relief.
Here, in contrast, we do not require heightened fact pleading of
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (citations omitted).
143. See infra Part V.B.
144. See Seiner, supra note 19; Seiner, supra note 8.
145. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
146. See, e.g., Ross v. Runyon, 859 F. Supp. 15, 21-22 (D.D.C. 1994)
("[D]iscriminatory intent and proof of disparate treatment are notoriously
difficult to establish [in employment-discrimination cases]."); Seiner, supra note
19, at 136-37 ("Establishing an employer's discriminatory intent in a case can
be the most difficult hurdle for the employee to overcome.").
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be even trickier. What it means to plausibly plead discriminatory
intent under Title VII remains an open question and will likely be a
matter for the courts to resolve. This Article attempts to define
what facts are necessary to plausibly plead discriminatory intent
pursuant to Title VII through a proposed analytical framework.147
Before undertaking this analysis, however, it is important to
understand how establishing intent in a Title VII case is different
from other areas of the law.
In particular, the facts of a typical employment-discrimination
matter are quite distinct from those of either Twombly or Iqbal.
Employment discrimination is an everyday occurrence in our
society, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") receiving over 95,000 charges of discrimination in fiscal
year 2008 alone."4 Over the past decade, the EEOC has found
reasonable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred in
thousands of charges brought pursuant to Title VII.149 It is therefore
much more plausible on its face that employment discrimination has
occurred than that a high-level governmental conspiracy has been
perpetrated or that a complex antitrust violation has been carried
out. 150
I was recently able to uncover substantial data which further
support the conclusion that employment discrimination continues to
thrive in our society, further differentiating a typical employment-
discrimination case from the facts of Twombly and Iqbal. The
statistical information provided below examines perhaps the two
most critical components of Title VII litigation-the motion for
summary judgment and the actual trial of the claims involved in the
case. " The data are revealing and show that discriminatory
attitudes are far from a vestige of the past. As these data
demonstrate, alleging employment discrimination-at least in the
proper factual context-is alleging a plausible claim in our society.
A. Federal Judicial Center Study-Summary-Judgment Data
Researchers at the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") performed
an analysis of the likelihood of an employment-discrimination claim
147. See infra Part VI.
148. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Charge Statistics FY
1997 Through FY 2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement
/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). Interestingly, these charge numbers
have increased dramatically from the prior fiscal year 2007, when
approximately 83,000 charges were filed. Id.
149. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 Charges (Includes Concurrent Charges with ADEA, ADA
and EPA) FY 1997-FY 2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement
/titlevii.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
150. See supra Part II.C-D (discussing the facts of the Twombly and Iqbal
Supreme Court decisions).
151. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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surviving summary judgment.5 2 In Title VII cases, the battles are
often fought at the summary-judgment stage of the proceedings153
when the defendant attempts to show that even if the facts are
considered in the light most favorable to the opposing party, the
plaintiff still cannot prevail in the case.154  This stage of the
proceedings often proves pivotal in many Title VII cases as the
"increasing use of summary judgment" has resulted in the "gradual
and continuing erosion of the factfinder's role in federal employment
discrimination cases." "
The FJC maintains data on summary-judgment motions that
were filed in federal district court cases terminated during the 2006
fiscal year.5 5 The FJC collected this data from almost every federal
district court, and the data includes 276,120 civil matters that were
terminated during that year. '7  The study documented 62,938
summary-judgment motions (and related court orders) that were
filed out of all of these civil cases. '58
From this data the FJC performed a more limited search that
was restricted exclusively to employment-discrimination cases,
including civil-rights matters and disability cases brought in the
employment context.159 Thus, the FJC examined those employment
cases terminated in fiscal year 2006 where a motion for summary
152. See infra notes 156-63 (discussing FJC data); see also Seiner, supra
note 8, at 1032-35 (discussing the results of the FJC research). The author
would like to thank Joe Cecil and the FJC for assisting with the study outlined
in this Article.
153. Cf Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The
Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L.
REV. 203, 205-06 (1993) (arguing that "the increased inappropriate use of
summary judgment" has "silently curtail[ed] workers' civil rights claims" and
that the "misapplication of civil procedural rules to employment discrimination
cases threatens substantive anti-discrimination law").
154. See, e.g., Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and
Sexual Harassment, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 813, 821 (1999) ("If there is any
evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could find in favor of the
nonmovant, summary judgment is improper. In determining whether summary
judgment should be granted, the court resolves all ambiguities and draws all
reasonable inferences against the moving party.").
155. McGinley, supra note 153, at 206.
156. See Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Research Div., Fed.
Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael Baylson, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 4 (Aug.
13, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter FJC Memorandum]; see also Seiner,
supra note 8, at 1032-35.
157. See FJC Memorandum, supra note 156. This memorandum also lists
the three federal district courts from which data could not be collected. Id.; see
also Seiner, supra note 8, at 1032-35.
158. See FJC Memorandum, supra note 156; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1032-
35.
159. See Seiner, supra note 8, at 1032-35; E-mail from Joe S. Cecil, Sr.
Research Assoc., Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Joseph Seiner, Assistant Professor of
Law, Univ. of S.C. (May 19, 2008, 22:07:36 EST) (on file with author). Title VII
cases could not be specifically separated out as part of this analysis. See id.
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judgment was filed by the defendant and subsequently decided by
the federal court. 60  This search uncovered 3,983 summary-
judgment orders issued by the federal district courts.161 These
summary-judgment decisions were then classified as to the number
of decisions granting a defendant's motion, denying a defendant's
motion, or denying in part a defendant's motion.162 The results of
this research are detailed in the table below:
TABLE 1: SUMMARY JUDGMENT RESULTS"
Motion Result Number of Motions Percentage of Total
Granted 2,495 62.6%
Denied-in-part 724 18.2%
Denied 764 19.2%
Total 3,983 100%
The data provided by the FJC research are instructive."
Despite the purported increasing use of summary judgment to
eliminate Title VII claims,' 5 employment-discrimination claims at
least partially survive summary judgment 37.4% of the time when a
decision is issued by the court.166  While these numbers
unquestionably represent a very strong likelihood that many Title
160. See Seiner, supra note 8 at 1032-35; E-mail from Joe S. Cecil to Joseph
Seiner, supra note 159.
161. See Seiner, supra note 8 at 1032-35; E-mail from Joe S. Cecil to Joseph
Seiner, supra note 159.
162. See Seiner, supra note 8 at 1032-35; E-mail from Joe S. Cecil to Joseph
Seiner, supra note 159. It is unclear, however, the extent to which the
summary-judgment motions in the study specifically addressed a Title VII
claim in the case. See E-mail from Joe S. Cecil, Sr. Research Assoc., Fed.
Judicial Ctr., to Joseph Seiner, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of S.C. (June
20, 2008, 16:24:17 EST) (on file with author). See also Seiner, supra note 8 at
1032-35.
163. Seiner, supra note 8, at 1032-35; E-mail from Joe S. Cecil, to Joseph
Seiner, supra note 159.
164. For a superb analysis of summary judgment in employment-
discrimination cases, see Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary
Judgment Rates over Time, Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An
Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts (Cornell Law Sch., Research
Paper No. 08-022, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138373; see also
Seiner, supra note 8, at 1032-35 (discussing the results of FJC research).
165. See McGinley, supra note 153, at 205-06 (discussing the use of
summary judgment in employment-discrimination cases).
166. See E-mail from Joe S. Cecil to Joseph Seiner, supra note 159 (setting
forth the results of the FJC study). And, not all cases result in a summary-
judgment order being rendered by the district court. Indeed, according to
further FJC research, only "12.5% of employment discrimination cases (389 of
3,108 cases) are terminated by summary judgment." E-mail from Joe S. Cecil,
Sr. Research Assoc., Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Joseph Seiner, Assistant Professor of
Law, Univ. of S.C. (Sept. 24, 2008, 10:07:00 EST) (on file with author); see also
Seiner, supra note 8, at 1032-35 (discussing the results of the FJC research).
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VII claims will be thrown out on summary judgment, they also
represent the fact that that many claims are found to have enough
merit to proceed past this stage of the proceedings.'6 With almost
1,500 employment-discrimination claims in the study at least
partially surviving a motion for summary judgment, it becomes hard
to deny that many plaintiffs have a substantial amount of evidence
to support their claims of workplace discrimination. *
B. Jury Verdict Research Analysis-Trial Outcome Data
I was also able to obtain information on the likelihood that a
Title VII plaintiff will prevail at trial.1' Jury Verdict Research@ -
Palm Beach Gardens, Fl. ("JVR") has compiled a nationwide
database of verdicts in employment cases.7 o Though the JVR
database does not contain all jury verdicts rendered across the
country, "it receives a sufficient sample .. . to produce descriptive
statistics for [certain] areas of litigation."' The data thus provide
an insightful sampling of jury verdicts in employment-
discrimination cases. 72
JVR was able to provide data on the likelihood of an
employment-discrimination plaintiff recovering at trial during the
years 2001 to 2007.173 Interestingly, the data have remained fairly
consistent over this time frame, never fluctuating more than 7%
over the entire seven-year period and usually hovering at or near
the 60% range. 7 4  For example, in 2001, a plaintiff had a 61%
167. See E-mail from Joe S. Cecil to Joseph Seiner supra note 159.
168. See id.
169. See E-mail from Managing Editor, Jury Verdict Research, to Joseph
Seiner, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of S.C. (May 27, 2009, 08:55:00 EST)
(on file with author); see also JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE
LIABILITY: JURY AwARD TRENDS AND STATISTICS (2008).
170. See E-mail from Managing Editor to Joseph Seiner, supra note 169.
JVR receives information on verdicts "from every state in the nation." JURY
VERDICT RESEARCH, supra note 169, at v. The data is gathered by researchers
who review court files, as well as from reports "provided by plaintiff and defense
attorneys, law clerks, legal reporters, publications, and media sources." Id.
171. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, supra note 169, at v. According to JVR, its
"cases are collected in an impartial manner, with an equal emphasis on the
collection of plaintiff and defense verdicts and with no intentional bias toward
extreme awards or geographic regions." Id.
172. See Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment
Discrimination Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 762-65
(2008) (reviewing JVR data provided on punitive damages in Title VII
employment-discrimination cases).
173. See JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, supra note 169, at 42; E-mail from
Managing Editor to Joseph Seiner, supra note 169. This aggregate data
includes both federal and state employment-discrimination cases. E-mail from
Managing Editor, Jury Verdict Research, to Joseph Seiner, Assistant Professor
of Law, Univ. of S.C. (Sept. 21, 2009, 09:28:40 EST) (on file with author). The
JVR data discussed in this Article excludes retaliation claims. Id.
174. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, supra note 169, at 42.
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probability of attaining a favorable jury verdict in an employment-
discrimination case.' 5  This number rose to 62% in 2007.176 if a
discrimination case goes to trial, plaintiffs have an excellent chance
of prevailing, as juries side in their favor well over half (and close to
two-thirds) of the time."'7  The probability of a favorable verdict
varies depending upon the nature of the suit but was above 50% in
most major areas of discrimination in 2007."17 A prevailing plaintiff
in a federal employment-discrimination trial can expect a median
compensatory award of $175,000. " Plaintiffs in state employment-
discrimination cases fare even better, as the median compensatory
jury award in these matters was $250,000 for the years 2001 to
2007.80
Obviously, a large number of cases fail to make it to a jury.
However, when an employment-discrimination plaintiff is successful
in advancing past the various hurdles that prohibit trial, she is
likely to receive a favorable verdict.182 And, that verdict is also
likely to come with a sizable monetary award.'83 Based on the above
FJC data indicating that hundreds of claims survive summary
judgment, as well as the JVR results demonstrating that
employment-discrimination plaintiffs prevail about 60% of the time
at trial, it is reasonable to infer that an allegation of Title VII
discrimination is, in many ways, plausible on its face.184
C. Other Studies
In addition to the two studies discussed above, there are various
other recent studies confirming the persistence of employment
discrimination, particularly in the hiring context. Some of this
research is particularly insightful and worth further discussion.
Most notably, a recent study conducted by researchers at Harvard
University and the University of Chicago looked specifically at the
existence of racial discrimination in hiring.'85 Racial discrimination
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 38-41 (providing data on age-, disability-, sex-, and racial-
discrimination claims).
179. Id. at 22.
180. Id. at 29.
181. See John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 522, 536 (2007) ("The rare civil lawsuit that actually goes to trial has
surprisingly little left to it after the summary judgment motion has been
denied."); Barry A. Macey, Response, Response to Theodore J. St. Antoine and
Michael C. Harper, 76 IND. L.J. 135, 138 (2001) ("[Mlany plaintiffs never enjoy
whatever advantages the jury system provides because their claims are thrown
out of court on summary judgment.").
182. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, supra note 169, at 29, 38-43.
183. See id. at 22, 29.
184. See id. at 42; FJC Memorandum, supra note 156.
185. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
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continues to be one of the most overt forms of discrimination in our
labor market, with African-Americans being twice as likely as white
workers to suffer unemployment.18 The study specifically examined
whether this racial discrimination is present in the hiring context. 87
To make this determination, the researchers responded to over
1300 help-wanted ads by sending four fictitious resumes to the
prospective employers.1s The resumes typically included one
higher-quality and one lower-quality resume with a white-sounding
name like "Emily Walsh or Greg Baker," as well as one higher-
quality and one lower-quality resume with an African-American
sounding name like "Lakisha Washington or Jamal Jones."' The
results of the analysis were startling. The study found substantial
differences in callback percentages on the basis of race.'90 The
percentages, which rose to the level of statistical significance,
revealed that African-American applicants needed to send about five
additional resumes to receive a callback than applicants with white-
sounding names.' 9' A white-sounding name is a valuable credential,
as it "yields as many more callbacks as an additional eight years of
experience on a resume."9 And the study found that white
applicants are better rewarded for having a higher-quality
resume. 19 Even the address on the resumes had an impact, as
"living in a wealthier (or more educated or Whiter) neighborhood
increases callback rates."9 4 The study thus leaves little doubt as to
the persistence of racial discrimination in our society, at least in the
hiring context.
Another recent study confirms the existence of discrimination in
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination, 94 AM. EcoN. REV. 991 (2004).
186. Id. at 991. African-Americans also "earn nearly 25% less when they are
employed." Id.
187. Id. at 991-92.
188. Id. The ads included prospective positions "in the sales, administrative
support, clerical, and customer services job categories." Id. at 992. The
resumes were sent to "a large spectrum of job quality, from cashier work at
retail establishments and clerical work in a mail room, to office and sales
management positions." Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. ("Applicants with White names need to send about 10 resumes to
get one callback whereas applicants with African-American names need to send
about 15 resumes.").
192. Id.
193. Id. ("Whites with higher-quality resumes receive nearly 30-percent
more callbacks than Whites with lower-quality resumes. On the other hand,
having a higher-quality resume has a smaller effect for African-Americans. In
other words, the gap between Whites and African-Americans widens with
resume quality.").
194. Id. "[Interestingly, African-Americans are not helped more than
Whites by living in a 'better' neighborhood." Id.
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hiring for older workers.' The study examined the impact of age on
the likelihood of an individual to get an interview for an entry-level
job (or close to entry-level position) by sending "functionally
identical" resumes to employers with different ages listed.'96 The
age differential was communicated to the employer by changing the
date of the applicant's high-school graduation. 97 To help control for
"perceived gaps in work history," the study only submitted
applications from women, as "an employer is more likely to assume
that a woman [would be] entering or reentering the labor market"
after helping with family responsibilities "rather than returning
from prison or a long spell of unemployment."'9" The study revealed
that it is much more difficult for older workers to find employment,
identifying "an upward trend for the interview response based on
date of high school graduation."'99 For example, in one state that
was studied, the average younger employment seeker had to submit
nineteen job applications to receive one interview, while an older
worker needed to submit twenty-seven applications. 200 The study
concluded that age-based discrimination is quite similar to201discrimination faced by women and African-Americans.
Numerous other research studies have highlighted the presence
of discrimination across various industries and protected categories,
particularly in the hiring context. One study found that females had
a more difficult time securing employment on the waitstaff of
upscale restaurants, revealing "strong evidence of discrimination
against women in high-price[d] restaurants."2 0 2 Another paper
analyzing the impact of race on hiring found a substantial impact,
with African-American applicants "anywhere between 50 and 500
percent less likely to be considered by employers as an equally
qualified white job applicant."203 Yet another study focusing on
women lawyers revealed that more female attorneys "experienced
195. See Joanna N. Lahey, Age, Women, and Hiring: An Experimental Study,
J. HUM. RESOURCES, Winter 2008, at 30.
196. Id. at 30-33. "Additionally, ten firms were chosen in each city as 'call-
ins'; company names and numbers were randomly selected from the Verizon
Superpages." Id. at 33.
197. Id. at 33.
198. Id. at 34.
199. Id. at 36.
200. Id. at 37.
201. Id. at 46.
202. David Neumark, Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit
Study, 111 Q.J. EcoN. 915, 917-18 (1996). Interestingly, "customer
discrimination" may play a role in the food industry, as "the proportion male
among the waitstaff is significantly positively related to the proportion male
among the clientele, both overall and (more so) within the high- and medium-
price restaurant categories." Id. at 918-19.
203. Devah Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for Studies of Employment
Discrimination: Contributions, Critiques, and Directions for the Future, ANNALS
AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Scl., Jan. 2007, at 104, 114.
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discrimination once on the job than in the recruiting and hiring
process," and about a quarter of the women indicated that they had
204been subjected to sexual harassment.
Whether on the basis of race, age, or sex, the above studies
demonstrate continued and persistent discrimination in our society.
Perhaps because it is much more easily measured, the studies tend
to emphasize the disparity between groups in securing initial
employment. There is little reason to believe, however, that this
discrimination is any less present in the actual employment setting.
Though significant strides have been made in eradicating
employment discrimination since the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, discriminatory behavior continues to thrive.205
V. DIFFERENT FACTUAL PLEADING REQUIREMENT FOR TITLE VII
CLAIMS
The data outlined above, combined with the unique role of
summary judgment in employment-discrimination cases, strongly
suggest that the factual pleading requirement for Title VII cases
should be significantly different from the requirements faced by the
plaintiffs in Twombly and Iqbal.
A. Distinction Between Title VII Claims and Claims Like Those in
Twombly and Iqbal
The data outlined above reflect that many Title VII claims
survive the summary-judgment stage of the proceedings in federal
court.206 Similarly, when employment-discrimination cases are
decided by a jury, the majority-about sixty percent-result in a
favorable verdict for the plaintiff, with a large average monetary
payout. 207  There can be little doubt that substantial numbers of
employment claims have merit, as the federal agency charged with
eradicating discrimination finds cause in thousands of cases each
year, as federal judges continue to permit substantial percentages of
204. Janet Rosenberg et al., Now that We Are Here: Discrimination,
Disparagement, and Harassment at Work and the Experience of Women
Lawyers, 7 GENDER & Soc'Y 415, 422-23 (1993). Similarly, "the women in this
study were continually exposed to more egregious, if subtle, forms of
disparagement. Approximately two-thirds of our respondents reported being
addressed as 'honey' or 'dear' and being the butt of remarks emphasizing gender
and sexuality. . . in professional situations." Id. at 422.
205. Cf. Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters,
22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 702-03 (2005) ("[Dlespite all of the EEOC's
shortcomings, the agency continues to play an irreplaceable role in the battle to
eradicate employment discrimination.").
206. See supra Part IV.A (discussing FJC summary-judgment data in
employment-discrimination cases). Indeed, almost 1500 employment-
discrimination claims at least partially survived a motion for summary
judgment during the time frame of the study.
207. See supra Part IV.B (discussing JVR data on jury trials in employment-
discrimination cases, which include both state and federal cases).
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employment-discrimination claims to survive summary judgment,
and as juries comprised of average members of our society continue
to find discrimination in the majority of instances. In the aggregate,
then, the research discussed in this Article strongly suggests that
discrimination is not a remnant of the past and continues to plague
the employment setting. Indeed, it has been argued that
"discrimination is so firmly rooted in our society that it can never be
completely eradicated."20 8
As the data discussed in this Article leaves little question
regarding the persistence of employment discrimination, a strong
argument can be made that an allegation of discriminatory intent in
the employment context is on its face plausible. While Iqbal warns
against making conclusory allegations about discriminatory intent
without the proper factual support,209 the decision (like Twombly)
arises miles from the employment setting, where discrimination is a
frequent occurrence.210 Indeed, both Twombly and Iqbal involve
allegations that on their face seem somewhat extraordinary.
Alleging that the FBI director and the Attorney General of the
United States undertook a policy to violate the civil rights of a
particular group211 or that major telephone companies engaged in a
complex and unlawful conspiracy to prevent entry into the market212
are somewhat fantastic claims. This did not mean that these
allegations were untrue-but on their face the claims certainly
raised doubts, and there were "obvious alternative [and lawful]
explanation [s]" for the alleged conduct involved.21 3 These conclusory
allegations-without some factual detail supporting the claims-
seemed hollow, unsubstantiated, and implausible.2 14
Based on the data set forth above, it is far more plausible to
believe that an employer has intended to discriminate against one of
its workers than it is to believe the unlikely factual scenarios
208. Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement
After 35 Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105
DICK. L. REV. 305, 308 n.3 (2001) (emphasis added).
209. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
210. See supra Part IV (discussing employment-discrimination studies); see
also Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust
Conspiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 627, 638 (2008) ("Viewed more
pragmatically, the Sherman One conspiracy claim is dramatically different from
Swierkiewicz. The Title VII-type burden shifting analysis has no place in the
context of Sherman One.").
211. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942, 1944.
212. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
213. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. As the Iqbal Court suggested, "the arrests
Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory
intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United States and who
had potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts." Id.
214. However, the Iqbal Court noted that the allegations are not impossible
or "nonsensical," and the claims were not rejected on the grounds that they
were "unrealistic." Id. Rather, it was the "conclusory" nature of these
ambitious allegations that caused them to fail.
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presented by Twombly and Iqbal. Employment discrimination
(which is likely to occur on a fairly regular basis) can easily be
contrasted with these recent Supreme Court decisions, especially
considering that the Court specifically noted the possible factual
alternatives that are "more likely" than the facts alleged by the
Twombly and Iqbal plaintiffs.215
This is not to say that a simple conclusory allegation of
discriminatory intent in an employment case will sufficiently state a
plausible claim. Indeed, Iqbal expressly states that this cannot be
216the case. Rather, as Iqbal requires, a claim alleging improper
discriminatory intent in the workplace must be made in the proper
factual context.2 17 However, the required factual support for an
employment-discrimination claim, which often has merit, should be
significantly different than it is for a complex antitrust or high-level
governmental-conspiracy claim.218 Allegations of discriminatory
intent in the employment setting must be sufficiently supported
with necessary facts, but this requirement should be considered a
somewhat lower factual threshold than it was for the more unlikely
scenarios presented by the plaintiffs in Twombly and Iqbal. 9
A basic allegation of negligent driving-which occurs on a fairly
routine basis-is expressly endorsed as acceptable by the sample
forms attached to the federal rules.220 Similarly, a basic allegation of
employment discrimination (which, as demonstrated by this Article,
also occurs on a regular basis) should also satisfy the federal
pleading requirements when made with the proper factual support.
This Article helps define the proper factual setting for a plausible
Title VII claim and sets forth a proposed factual pleading framework
that would support any individual case of intentional employment
215. Id. at 1950-51.
216. See id. at 1954 (rejecting Iqbal's argument that discriminatory intent
can be alleged "generally").
217. Id. ("[Tihe Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint's
conclusory statements without reference to its factual context.").
218. See, e.g., id. at 1950-52; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-
70 (2007); see also Hartnett, supra note 127, at 496 ("A requirement of
plausibility will, however, apply differently in different substantive areas of the
law and in different factual situations-it will depend on what facts the
substantive law makes material and on the appropriate inferential connections
between facts.").
219. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51 (discussing factual scenarios that were
"more likely" than those presented by the plaintiffs).
220. FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11 (providing the following as a sufficient
negligence allegation: "On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a
motor vehicle against the plaintiff."). It should also be noted that Form 11
(previously Form 9) is discussed with approval in the Twombly decision.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10 ("A defendant wishing to prepare an answer in
the simple fact pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer; a
defendant seeking to respond to plaintiffs' conclusory allegations in the § 1
context would have little idea where to begin.").
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221discrimination.
B. Unique Role of Summary Judgment in Title VII Cases
The Supreme Court's decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.
further supports the argument that there should be a different
factual threshold for pleading employment-discrimination claims.
In Swierkiewicz, the Court held that an employment-discrimination
litigant need not plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case of
discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss. 2 23 To establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must
show that she is part of a protected class, that she is qualified, that
she suffered an adverse employment action, and that there is other
224
evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Thus, a
plausible employment-discrimination allegation, which falls
between the possible and probable thresholds,u' requires a lower
factual showing than this traditional prima facie case.226
In holding that a Title VII plaintiff need not plead a prima facie
case, the Swierkiewicz Court emphasized the unique function of
summary judgment in employment-discrimination cases, noting that
"liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions" must be
used "to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of
unmeritorious claims."2 7  This approach permits the parties to
address vague or unmeritorious claims through a motion for
summary judgment, which in turn allows the parties to "focus
litigation on the merits of a claim."228
Indeed, summary judgment performs a distinctive role in Title
VII cases. The sufficiency of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case is typically evaluated at the summary-judgment stage of the
proceedings. Once the plaintiff makes the prima facie showing,
221. SeeinfraPartVI.
222. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002).
223. Id.; cf. Huffman, supra note 210, at 638 ("The distinction [between Title
VII and Sherman Act cases] is made clearer by noting Justice Thomas's
admonition in Swierkiewicz that 'the McDonnell Douglas framework does not
apply in every employment discrimination case.' That is much in contrast to
the Sherman One standard. The requirement that a plaintiff plead and prove
that conduct was the result of a conspiracy is immutable." (citing Swierkiewicz,
534 U.S. at 511)).
224. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The
fourth element of the prima facie case is often established by showing that
"similarly situated employees outside of the protected class received more
favorable treatment." Lucas v. PyraMax Bank, FSB, 539 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir.
2008).
225. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (noting that
plausibility "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully") (emphasis added).
226. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-11.
227. Id. at 512.
228. Id. at 514.
229. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After
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the employer must assert a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the alleged unlawful employment action.2so If this showing is
sufficiently made, the plaintiff maintains the burden of production
and persuasion of establishing that the employer's stated reason is
pretext for discrimination.m3 Thus, at summary judgment, an
employee must refute the employer's stated reason for taking the
adverse action. 22
In Iqbal, the Court found it problematic that there was a
nondiscriminatory explanation for the government's policies that
were put in place after September 11th that was "more likely" than
the plaintiffs assertions of discrimination-a desire by high-ranking
officials to prevent terrorism. Because he had not refuted this
explanation, Iqbal's complaint failed to state a plausible claim.2 By
contrast, in employment cases a mechanism has long existed to
refute the employer's explanation for taking an adverse action
against the employee. As set forth above, during summary
judgment the plaintiff must show that the employer's explanation is
a mere pretext for discrimination. 23 5  This unique function of
summary judgment in employment-discrimination matters-
refuting the employer's explanation for the adverse action-helps
explain why a somewhat lower factual showing must be made at the
Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2298 (1995) ("In the conventional application of
summary judgment principles to McDonnell Douglas-Burdine cases, the prima
facie case is treated as a required 'element' of the case, and the plaintiffs failure
to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a prima facie
case entitles the defendant to summary judgment.").
230. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973)
(discussing the "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" requirement); Malamud,
supra note 229, at 2301 ("In the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure,
the 'rebuttal' or 'intermediate' stage of the case occurs after the plaintiff has
proved a prima facie case. The employer must then 'articulate' a 'legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason' for the adverse employment action.").
231. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)
("Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this
framework, 'the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times
with the plaintiff.'" (quoting Tex. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1981))); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804 ("On remand,
respondent must, as the Court of Appeals recognized, be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection
was in fact pretext.").
232. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
233. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) ("[Tjhe arrests Mueller
oversaw were likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to
detain aliens who were illegally present in the United States and who had
potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts."). The Iqbal Court
also noted that there was a "more likely" explanation for the Sherman Act
violation alleged in Twombly, which could be "explained by, lawful,
unchoreographed free-market behavior." Id. at 1950.
234. Id. at 1951-52.
235. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
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complaint stage of the proceedings in Title VII cases and why
Swierkiewicz is still good law as to these specific claims.23 6
After Iqbal and Twombly, then, most civil litigants should
refute any obvious alternative explanations for the alleged unlawful
conduct set forth in the complaint.2 17  Employment-discrimination
plaintiffs, however, are not expected to make this showing until
summary judgment, and Swierkiewicz is clear that a heightened
pleading standard must not be applied to workplace-discrimination
claims.2 38  Thus, the Swierkiewicz Court's emphasis on a relaxed
pleading standard and liberal discovery is a direct result of the
distinct function of summary judgment in Title VII cases and
distinguishes these cases from other civil claims.239
In employment-discrimination matters summary judgment
often acts as a broad filter in rejecting workplace claims that lack
merit.240 In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court made clear that this
filtering process should not take place at the earlier motion-to-
dismiss stage of the proceedings in Title VII matters. 241  And
Twombly and Iqbal do not abrogate the basic holding of
Swierkiewicz as applied to employment-discrimination cases-
indeed, Twombly even cites to Swierkiewicz with approval.24 2
In summary, as a general matter it is far more plausible to
believe that an employer has discriminated against one of its
workers than it is to believe the somewhat doubtful factual
allegations set forth in Twombly or Iqbal. The studies set forth in
this Article fully support the argument that discrimination in
employment continues to be a serious problem.243 An allegation of
discrimination made pursuant to Title VII is therefore distinct from
(and far more plausible than) the assertions found in these recent
Supreme Court decisions. The research set forth above, combined
with the unique role of summary judgment in employment-
discrimination cases, strongly suggests that there is a different (and
somewhat lower) factual-pleading requirement for Title VII claims.
Unfortunately, however, Twombly and Iqbal fail to provide any
substantive guidance as to what facts are necessary to sufficiently
plead a plausible employment-discrimination claim.
236. See supra Part III.B.
237. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (noting an alternative explanation for the
alleged unlawful conduct).
238. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002)
(concluding that employment-discrimination plaintiffs need not plead a prima
facie case of discrimination).
239. Id. at 510-12.
240. See generally McGinley, supra note 153, at 206 (discussing the use of
summary judgment in employment-discrimination cases).
241. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512-15; cf. Spencer, supra note 41, at
489-93 (discussing the "filtering function" of the complaint).
242. See supra Part III.B.
243. See supra Part IV.
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In the following Part, I propose a new analytical framework for
alleging discriminatory intent in Title VII cases. This three-part
pleading model attempts to provide a framework for determining
what facts are necessary to put discriminatory intent in the proper
context and to sufficiently allege a plausible Title VII claim.
VI. NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ALLEGING DISCRIMINATORY
INTENT
While Twombly and Iqbal have significantly changed the
pleading rules for civil cases, these recent Supreme Court decisions
provide little guidance on what must be alleged to sufficiently state
discriminatory intent in a Title VII case. We do know from these
cases that the overall allegation of employment discrimination must
be plausible on its face.2" Similarly, we learned from Iqbal that
discriminatory intent cannot be alleged "generally" and must be
made in the proper factual context.24  Finally, from Swierkiewicz,
we know that this proper factual context is something less than a
prima facie showing for Title VII allegations. 4' As I have argued
above, Swierkiewicz is still good law as to Title VII cases, and the
lower factual threshold required by this decision is well supported
by the various studies demonstrating the inherent plausibility of
employment-discrimination allegations.24 7
Though Twombly and Iqbal require a civil claim to be plausible
on its face, the decisions do not define what plausibility actually
means or what factual components would comprise a plausible
claim. The common dictionary definition of "plausible" provides that
a plausible argument is one that "appear[s] worthy of belief."2 48 And
this definition seems to be how the Supreme Court generally uses
the term. In Iqbal, for example, the Court provided that plausibility
"is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."249 So the
plausibility line falls somewhere in the gray area between possible
and probable.2 0  As many employment-discrimination claims at
244. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
245. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 ("[Tlhe Federal Rules do not require courts to
credit a complaint's conclusory statements without reference to its factual
context.").
246. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002).
247. See supra Part IV.
248. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/plausible (last visited June 12, 2009); see also THE
OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF CuRRENT ENGLISH 602 (1999) (defining
plausible as "seeming reasonable or probable.").
249. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007) (emphasis added)).
250. Id.
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least rise to the level of being possible and/or probable,2 5' it is
reasonable to expect that these allegations-with the proper factual
support-should often survive the dismissal stage of the
proceedings. 52
I have attempted to formulate an analytical framework that
answers the difficult question of what factual context must be
asserted to sufficiently plead discriminatory intent in all individual
cases of intentional discrimination brought under Title VII. This
three-part framework pinpoints exactly where plausibility falls in
the gray area between possible and probable that is discussed in the
recent Supreme Court decisions." It also provides the precise
factual context that must be alleged for Title VII claims and
establishes a clear road map for litigants to follow when asserting
an employment-discrimination claim, and it navigates the Twombly
and Iqbal decisions and clearly satisfies the pleading requirements
of the federal rules. If adopted, this framework would streamline
the pleading process in employment-discrimination cases and
simplify this area of the law. I am aware of no pleading model for
alleging discriminatory intent after Iqbal in Title VII cases, and this
suggested model would fill that void in the scholarship. The
analytical model advocated in this Article also comports with-and
is patterned after-the pleading framework I have proposed
previously for Title VII claims.254 In light of Iqbal, however, the
framework set forth in this Article emphasizes adequately pleading
discriminatory intent.
The pleading model proposed by this Article is thus intended to
satisfy the Supreme Court's standard for alleging discriminatory
intent as articulated in Iqbal.255  As a practical matter, however,
pleading discriminatory intent and alleging an actual claim of Title
VII discrimination cannot be easily separated out for analytical
purposes. Thus, the proposed model, which emphasizes adequately
asserting intent in a Title VII case, also provides a basic framework
for alleging an overall employment-discrimination claim. To
sufficiently plead discriminatory intent pursuant to Title VII (and to
adequately state an overall Title VII claim), a plaintiff should thus
allege the following three elements.
A. Factual Context
As the Iqbal Court noted, discriminatory intent must be alleged
251. See supra Part IV.
252. See supra Part IV.
253. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
254. See Seiner, supra note 19 (proposing a pleading standard for ADA
cases); Seiner, supra note 8 (suggesting a unified model for alleging Title VII
claims).
255. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
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in the proper "factual context."'" For Title VII claims, that factual
context must be sufficient to support an allegation of employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.2"' The statute prohibits an employer from taking an adverse
action against an employee on the basis of any one of these protected
characteristics. 258
Thus, to state the proper factual context for a Title VII claim,
the plaintiff must first assert the identity of the victim of the
discrimination.25 9 That is, the plaintiff should simply identify who it
is that has suffered the adverse action in the employment setting.260
In most cases, this will be easily accomplished by indicating that "I
suffered an adverse employment action," though in some cases the
government, rather than the aggrieved individual, will be bringing
the suit.26 1 Asserting the identity of the victim is the easiest and
most straightforward fact that must be alleged in the complaint to
provide the proper context for establishing discriminatory intent.
Next, the plaintiff should allege the protected characteristic
that formed the basis of the employer's discriminatory intent and
resulting unlawful actions. 62  As noted above, Title VII protects
employees from being discriminated against on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."263  The plaintiff should
indicate in the complaint on which of these bases the employer has
discriminated.2 " Certainly, the employee can allege that she was
256. Id. at 1954.
257. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
258. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
259. Cf. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Title VII
relief is to be targeted to deter illegal discrimination and compensate its
victims.").
260. See Seiner, supra note 19, at 131-32 (noting that the victim should be
set forth in allegations of disability discrimination); Seiner, supra note 8, at
1043 (discussing the importance of pleading the victim's identity in an
employment-discrimination complaint and noting that this requirement is
straightforward).
261. For example, the EEOC often brings suit on behalf of individuals who
have suffered employment discrimination. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals,
Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 2008) ("This case arises from a Title VII action
brought by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on
behalf of Clinton Ingram, a Muslim American, against Sunbelt Rentals, Inc.").
262. See, e.g., Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) ("It is
axiomatic that mistreatment at work, whether through subjection to a hostile
environment or through such concrete deprivations as being fired or being
denied a promotion, is actionable under Title VII only when it occurs because of
an employee's sex, or other protected characteristic."); see also Seiner, supra
note 8, at 1043-44 (discussing the importance of pleading the relevant protected
characteristic in an employment-discrimination complaint).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
264. When alleging the protected characteristic, the plaintiff should also be
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discriminated against on the basis of multiple protected
characteristics, if applicable to the situation (for example, "I was
fired because I am an African-American and because I am a
female."). 265  If, during the course of discovery, the plaintiff learns
that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of an
additional protected characteristic not set forth in the complaint, the
court should liberally consider allowing the plaintiff to amend the
complaint to reflect this additional allegation.266
To place the employer's discriminatory intent in the proper
factual context, the plaintiff must further allege the adverse action
suffered by the victim.2 6 7  Thus, the employee must assert what
negative consequence she suffered as a result of the employer's
discriminatory intent.26 8 Title VII specifically states that an
employer may not "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise ... discriminate against any individual" on
the basis of a protected characteristic.26 9 Failing to hire and firing
an employee on the basis of a protected characteristic are therefore
statutorily enumerated "adverse acts."270 It is also likely, based on
Supreme Court precedent, that failure to promote and reassignment
with substantially different work duties also amount to adverse
acts. 271 Aside from these clear adverse actions, whether a particular
employment action rises to the level of being sufficiently adverse is
as specific as possible, particularly since providing this information to the
employer should typically be relatively straightforward. Thus, for example, a
plaintiff should allege that she was discriminated against because she is a
woman and because she is African-American, rather than simply stating that
the adverse action was taken because of sex and race.
265. Cf D. Aaron Lacy, The Most Endangered Title VII Plaintiff?.
Exponential Discrimination Against Black Males, 86 NEB. L. REV. 552, 554-55
(2008) (discussing the theory of intersectionality and noting that "[sicholars
have advocated for the creation of an intersectional claim for doubly burdened
groups such as Black women, Latina women, and Asian women").
266. The plaintiff would still be required, however, to sufficiently exhaust all
administrative requirements. See, e.g., McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d
264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Title VII requires employees to exhaust their
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.") (citation omitted);
Seiner, supra note 8, at 1044.
267. See Seiner, supra note 8, at 1044-45 (discussing the necessity of
pleading the relevant adverse action in an employment-discrimination
complaint); Seiner, supra note 19, at 134-36 (discussing the "adverse action"
requirement for disability claims).
268. See, e.g., Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 551-52 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
("In order to present a viable claim of employment discrimination under Title
VII, a plaintiff must show he suffered an adverse employment action.").
269. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
270. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
271. Cf Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) ("A
tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.").
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often a question of jurisdiction, and the courts have applied varying
tests.272 Some jurisdictions impose a somewhat stringent standard
for qualifying adverse acts, while other courts have a more relaxed
requirement.273 The plaintiff should therefore make sure to properly
assert the adverse action she suffered based on the relevant case
law, as failure to do so would subject the complaint to dismissal.274
Finally, the plaintiff must allege the approximate timing of the
adverse action. 275 The plaintiff should thus assert her best estimate
of when the specific negative action took place.27 ' By providing the
employer with the timing of the purported discrimination, it can
much more easily begin an investigation into the allegations.7 For
discrete acts, such as failure to hire or termination, identifying this
date should be relatively simple. For acts that are not as clear-cut,
or for continuing violations (such as claims of sexual harassment),
identifying the timing of the discrimination can be a more onerous
272. See Seiner, supra note 19, at 135 (noting "varying interpretations as to
what constitutes an adverse action"); Seiner, supra note 8, at 1038-41
(discussing different circuit court approaches to evaluating the "adverse
employment action" requirement).
273. See Seiner, supra note 19, at 134-36; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1038-41.
Though beyond the scope of this article, the Supreme Court has specifically
addressed what constitutes an adverse employment action in the retaliation
context, holding that the retaliation "provision covers those (and only those)
employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable
employee or job applicant." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
274. See, e.g., Runkle v. Gonzales, 391 F. Supp. 2d 210, 221 (D.D.C. 2005)
("The defendants argue that none of these counts state a claim under Title VII
because none of the discriminatory acts the plaintiff alleges within them
amount to 'adverse actions.' The court agrees and accordingly grants the
defendants' motion to dismiss.").
275. Cf. Stroud v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 n.2 (N.D. Ga.
1975) ("In order to be entitled to relief under Title VII, plaintiff must allege and
prove that either an overt act of discrimination or a continuing pattern and
practice of discrimination occurred within 180 days of the filing of her EEOC
complaint."), affd, 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1977).
276. By providing the approximate date of the discrimination, the defendant
and the court can also make certain that the plaintiff has adequately complied
with the timing requirements of the EEOC charge-filing process. See Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002) ("An individual must file a
charge within the statutory time period .... In a State that has an entity with
the authority to grant or seek relief with respect to the alleged unlawful
practice, an employee who initially files a grievance with that agency must file
the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the employment practice; in all
other States, the charge must be filed within 180 days."); Deborah L. Brake &
Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86
N.C. L. REv. 859, 867 n.17 (2008) (noting the timing requirements for filing an
EEOC charge); Seiner, supra note 19, at 135-36; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1046.
277. See Seiner, supra note 19, at 135-36 (noting that the plaintiff should
allege the timing of the adverse action in ADA cases); Seiner, supra note 8, at
1045-46 (discussing the timing requirements for Title VII claims).
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task.27 ' The courts should take a flexible approach in permitting
plaintiffs to amend a complaint in these circumstances, particularly
where discovery has further clarified the exact timing of the
discrimination involved."' The timing of the adverse action, then,
helps clarify the nature of the discrimination asserted and provides
a more developed factual context for the allegations in the
complaint.
In summary, to provide a sufficient factual context for the
allegations of discriminatory intent contained in a Title VII
complaint, the plaintiff must set forth the victim of the
discrimination, the protected characteristic that caused the
employer to discriminate, the adverse action that the employee
suffered, and the approximate time that the adverse action occurred.
By asserting these essential facts, the employee puts the
discriminatory intent in the proper setting and gives the employer
sufficient notice of the claim. 280 All Title VII litigants should have
this basic information at their disposal, and it should not be difficult
to include these factual elements in the complaint. By providing
this factual context, the employee avoids making the general or
conclusory allegation of discriminatory intent against which Iqbal so
strongly advises.m
B. Discriminatory Intent
In addition to pleading the factual elements discussed above,
the employee must also allege causation to properly assert
278. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-18 (discussing a continuing-violation
allegation arising in the harassment context); Seiner, supra note 8, at 1045.
However, harassment claims are beyond the scope of this Article. See infra
Part VI.E (discussing the limitations of the proposed framework).
279. See Seiner, supra note 8, at 1045-46; cf. Brake & Grossman, supra note
276, at 866 ("Numerous doctrines under Title VII place pressure on employees
to recognize and challenge discrimination quickly when they experience it.
They include the short statute of limitations, strict rules defining the acts that
trigger it, inadequate tolling and discovery rules, a special set of requirements
for reporting harassment, and an all-but-mandatory extra layer of internal
dispute resolution that does not extend the time for formally asserting rights.").
280. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (stating that
the plaintiff need only give the opposing party "fair notice of what the plaintiffs
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957))); Seiner, supra note 8, at 1043-47 (discussing the pleading
requirements for a Title VII claim). It should also be considered that in
contrast to many other civil actions, Title VII defendants frequently receive
notice of the allegations before a federal lawsuit is brought. Id. at 1049 n.253
("Title VII claims are different from many other civil causes of action in that the
defendant typically will have received notice of the relevant allegation of
discrimination long before a federal complaint is ever filed. Plaintiffs are
required to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC prior to bringing suit,
and defendants receive notice of this charge.").
281. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
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discriminatory intent.82 The plaintiff must allege that the adverse
action was taken by the employer because of the employee's
protected characteristic.2 By making this assertion, the plaintiff
satisfies the discriminatory-intent requirement of Title VII, which
prohibits the employer from taking an unlawful action "because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."2 M The
assertion of discriminatory intent therefore provides the causal link
between the employer's prohibited actions and the characteristics
protected by the statute.*
Thus, by asserting that the discrimination suffered was because
of the individual's protected characteristic, the plaintiff has satisfied
the discriminatory-intent requirement for all Title VII intentional-
discrimination claims.2 8 This allegation of discriminatory intent,
made alongside the critical facts of the claim, which assert the
victim's identity, the relevant protected characteristic, the adverse
action, and the timing of the unlawful act, sufficiently states a claim
of employment discrimination.28 7 And this allegation of
discriminatory intent easily complies with the federal rules.
The sufficiency of the factual allegations required by this
proposed framework is best illustrated by the sample pleading form
attached to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 This form
provides that an adequate allegation of negligence would state that
"[o]n date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle
against the plaintiff."289 Thus, an adequate allegation of a violation
of federal civil law includes the timing and nature of the act as well
as an assertion of causation (in the above example, negligent
driving).290 The proposed analytical framework for pleading Title
VII claims easily satisfies these requirements, as it provides the
basic factual components of the employment-discrimination claim
coupled with an assertion of the causal link between the unlawful
acts and the protected characteristic of the victim. 29' Just as an
282. See, e.g., B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 457 (2008)
(noting that "the fundamental question for most discrimination claims is that of
intent"); Seiner, supra note 19, at 136-38; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1046-47.
283. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. Id.
286. See Seiner, supra note 19, at 136-38; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1047 ("As
a critical element of a Title VII claim, causation should be stated by the alleged
victim of discrimination to provide notice to the employer that the action was
taken intentionally.").
287. See supra Part VI.A.
288. FED. R. CIv. P. Form 11.
289. Id.
290. Id.; see also Seiner, supra note 8, at 1050 (discussing Form 11).
291. It is worth noting that the sample pleading form identifies the "place" of
the incident as a necessary component of a negligence claim. FED. R. Civ. P.
Form 11. While a Title VII plaintiff could certainly include in the complaint the
physical "place" where the discrimination occurred, this fact is already largely
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assertion of negligence, with the proper factual support, establishes
a sufficient claim under the federal rules,29 2 so too does an allegation
of discriminatory intent made in the appropriate factual context.
And, as already discussed, negligent driving and employment
discrimination both occur on a fairly regular basis in our society.293
As both claims are fairly common, they are distinguishable from the
more complex (and unlikely) allegations set forth in Twombly and
Iqbal.29 4 The more routine nature of employment discrimination and
negligent driving further explains why Form 11 and the
Swierkiewicz decision were cited with approval by the Twombly
Court and why a lower factual threshold likely applies to these
* * 295
specific claims.
C. Plaintiffs Rebuttal of Employer's Reason for Adverse Action
In Iqbal, the Court found it problematic that there was an easily
identifiable explanation for the allegedly unlawful policies that were
put in place after September 11th that was "more likely" than
Iqbal's assertions of discrimination-a desire by high-ranking
officials to prevent terrorism.296 For the Court, Iqbal's failure to
refute this explanation seemed to undermine any argument that the
plaintiff had plausibly stated a claim for discrimination.29 ' As
previously discussed, Title VII intentional-discrimination claims
already have a mechanism for rebutting the employer's asserted
"more likely" explanation for taking the adverse action. Under the
framework set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas,
the plaintiff must refute the employer's stated reason for taking the
adverse action at summary judgment.298  The McDonnell Douglas
test, combined with the Supreme Court's holding in Swierkiewicz,
suggests that a Title VII plaintiff is not required to rebut any "more
integrated into the proposed analytical pleading framework. Thus, an
individual asserting that she has been unlawfully terminated by her employer,
for example, has implicitly alleged that the discrimination either has occurred
at her place of work or is directly related to her workplace duties.
292. See id.
293. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part V (discussing why a lower factual threshold should
apply when pleading Title VII claims).
295. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563, 565 n.10, 569 n.14, 570
(2007). Twombly discusses the sample negligence form (Fed. R. Civ. P. Form
11) with approval in its previous Form 9 version. Id. at 565 n.10.
296. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
297. Id. at 1951-52.
298. See supra Part V.B. See generally Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Motions for
Summary Judgment When Employers Offer Multiple Justifications for Adverse
Employment Actions: Why the Exceptions Should Swallow the Rule, 2002 UTAH
L. REv. 335, 365-69 (discussing the legal importance of employers offering
multiple legitimate explanations for the employment action in question).
299. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A, 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002) (holding that
an employment-discrimination litigant need not plead a McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case in the complaint).
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likely"00 explanations for the employer's adverse action in the
context of the complaint. Indeed, it may even be the case that the
employee is unaware of the employer's rationale for taking the
adverse employment action at the time the complaint is filed.3 'o
This is particularly true in the hiring context, where the prospective
employee may simply fail to hear anything after submitting an
employment application to a potential employer. 3 02
Nonetheless, employers often do provide employees with a
reason for taking a particular adverse action.os When an employee
is terminated, for example, that worker is typically given a reason
for the discharge-such as poor performance, insubordination, or
company cutbacks. When the employee learns of the employer's
purported rationale for the adverse action prior to trial, the
employee should strongly consider rebutting the employer's
explanation in the complaint.3 " As already noted, an employee's
opportunity to rebut the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse action usually occurs at summary judgment,
rather than at the pleading stage of the proceedings.300  Thus,
rebutting the employer's stated reason in the complaint would be an
optional component of the proposed analytical framework.
However, by including in the complaint an explanation as to
why the employer's stated rationale is pretext for discrimination,
the plaintiff bolsters her claim and strengthens the allegations.
This pleading strategy also gives the plaintiff the first word as to the
true reason for the adverse action and undercuts the defendant's
subsequent response.06 With Iqbal in mind, then, it would benefit
300. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
301. See Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on
Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 2009, at A10 ("Plaintiffs claiming they were
the victims of employment discrimination .. . may not know exactly who
harmed them and how before filing suit. But plaintiffs can learn valuable
information during discovery.").
302. See, e.g., Michael J. Yelnosky, Salvaging the Opportunity: A Response to
Professor Clark, 28 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 151, 156 (1994) ("Problems of proof,
which are present in all hiring cases, may be worse with lower-skilled jobs
because generally there exists little, if any, paper record.").
303. See James Leonard, The Equality Trap: How Reliance on Traditional
Civil Rights Concepts Has Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 1, 48 (2005) ("Another difference between employees and applicants
is that the former are usually aware of the process that has led to an adverse
job action.").
304. Thus, for example, an employee who is told that she is being terminated
for poor performance could state in the complaint that she is in fact a good
performer and has received outstanding performance evaluations.
305. See supra Part V.B.
306. Indeed, it would not be unusual for an employer to give a different
explanation in its summary-judgment motion for taking the adverse action than
was given to the employee at the time the decision was made. See, e.g.,
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 284 (3d Cir. 2001) ("If
a plaintiff demonstrates that the reasons given for her termination did not
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an employee to rebut the employer's rationale for taking the
disputed employment action-if the employee is aware of that
rationale.o7 Rebutting the employer's reasoning should be relatively
simple and straightforward. However, as an optional component of
the framework, this rebuttal would only enhance the plaintiffs
claim and should certainly never be required by a court.
D. Summary of Proposed Title VII Pleading Framework
In summary, the proposed analytical pleading framework for
alleging discriminatory intent (and properly pleading a Title VII
claim in general) includes providing the overall factual context of
the claim, the causal link between the adverse action and the
protected characteristic, and an optional statement rebutting the
employer's rationale for its actions. This three-part pleading
framework for intentional claims of employment discrimination
brought pursuant to Title VII is summarized below:
(1) Plaintiff asserts the victim of the discrimination, the
protected characteristic of the individual, the adverse action
that was taken by the employer, and the timing of the
purported unlawful act;
(2) Plaintiff alleges a causal link between the adverse action
and the protected characteristic; and
(3) If applicable, plaintiff may rebut the employer's stated
reason for taking the adverse action.
The following example provides an illustration of a sufficient
allegation of Title VII employment discrimination. This example
easily comports with the above three-part analytical framework:
On January 1, 2010, my employer failed to promote me to a
position that I applied for because I am African-American.
Despite my employer's assertion that I am not qualified for
this position, I have the requisite background and experience
for the job.
This example demonstrates the straightforward nature of the
proposed framework and the ease with which it can be satisfied.
The above example clearly provides the victim ("I" or the individual
signing the complaint), the protected characteristic (African-
American), the purported adverse action (failure to promote), the
remain consistent, beginning at the time they were proffered and continuing
throughout the proceedings, this may be viewed as evidence tending to show
pretext, though of course it should be considered in light of the entire record.").
307. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009) (noting a "more
likely," nondiscriminatory explanation for the purported unlawful policy at
issue in the case, as well as a "more likely" explanation for the alleged Sherman
Act violation in Twombly).
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timing of the alleged violation (January 1, 2010), and the causal
connection (promotion denied because of protected status).
Additionally, this sample fact pattern further rebuts the employer's
stated reason for taking the adverse action. Such an allegation,
though simple, states a sufficient Title VII claim and clearly
establishes discriminatory intent.
Thus, the proposed pleading framework outlined above includes
the critical components of any individual claim of intentional
discrimination brought under Title VII. As already noted, this
model framework is consistent with the federal rules, and it
complies with the sample pleading form attached to the rules. 08
Similarly, the proposed framework adheres to both Twombly and
Iqbal. Indeed, a Title VII plaintiff complying with this framework
will have stated the factual nature of the discrimination suffered
and provided a causal link between the adverse act and the
protected characteristic, thereby stating a plausible claim for
relief.'09  And, by providing the factual background of the
discrimination in the first step of the model framework, the plaintiff
will have avoided making a general and conclusory allegation of
discriminatory intent.axo Finally, in many instances (as in the above
example), the plaintiff will also have rebutted the employer's stated
reason for taking the adverse action, leaving little doubt that she
has complied with Iqbal."'
The sufficiency of the proposed model framework can best be
seen in Judge Easterbrook's statement in a Title VII case that
"[blecause racial discrimination in employment is a claim upon
which relief can be granted . . . 'I was turned down for a job because
of my race' is all a complaint has to say."3 12  Though Judge
Easterbrook's pleading standard pre-dates both Twombly and Iqbal,
it demonstrates the relative ease with which a Title VII plaintiff can
satisfy the federal rules.13 The analytical pleading framework set
forth above requires slightly more than Judge Easterbrook in light
of the recent Supreme Court decisions, but the proposed model is
still straightforward and can be easily satisfied by plaintiffs.
308. FED. R. CIv. P. Form 11; see also supra Part I (discussing the sample
pleading form attached to federal rules).
309. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557-58 (2007). See also Seiner, supra note 8, at 1041-50 (discussing the
pleading requirements of Title VII). Cf. Seiner, supra note 19, at 138-39, 144-
45 (summarizing the pleading requirements for claims brought pursuant to
ADA).
310. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (warning against conclusory allegations).
311. See id. (noting "more likely," nondiscriminatory explanations for the
purported unlawful policy).
312. Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.)
(emphasis added).
313. See id; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1049 (discussing the Easterbrook
standard).
314. Judge Easterbrook's statement includes the victim, adverse action,
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Furthermore, the ease and simplicity of the proposed analytical
pleading framework for Title VII claims is well supported by the
Swierkiewicz holding that an employment-discrimination litigant
need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a
motion to dismiss.3 ' 5 Thus, the above framework does not require
that a plaintiff plead a prima facie Title VII case, but it does call for
the plaintiff to assert the essential factual elements of the claim.
And the studies set forth in this Article leave little doubt that
employment discrimination continues to pervade our society, 16an
allegation of discriminatory intent-combined with the factual
elements required in the proposed framework-clearly establishes a
plausible Title VII claim. Indeed, when put in the proper factual
context outlined above, a claim of discrimination is far more
plausible than the somewhat questionable factual allegations set
forth in Twombly and Iqbal. Unlike the plaintiffs in these recent
Supreme Court decisions, a plaintiff alleging all of the facts required
by the proposed pleading framework will have provided the
defendant with fair notice of the charges made against it, thereby
allowing the employer to begin looking into the allegations.1
Finally, it should also be noted that in addition to setting forth
the facts required by the proposed pleading framework, a Title VII
plaintiff should make certain that she has also complied with the
rules and case law of her particular jurisdiction. It is not unusual
for the case law and procedural rules to vary among courts, 38 and a
prudent plaintiff will make sure to satisfy any nuances in the local
319
protected characteristic, and a link between the protected characteristic and the
adverse act. The proposed framework set forth in this Article would also
include adding the timing of the discrimination, as well as an optional
statement rebutting the employer's reason for taking the adverse action. Cf.
Bennett, 153 F.3d at 518. ("Because success on a disparate-treatment approach
under Title VII . . . requires proof of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff might
want to allege intent-although this is implied by a claim of racial
'discrimination.'"); Seiner, supra note 8, at 1049. Additionally, the model
proposed in this Article suggests that the plaintiff should provide more
specificity as to the victim's protected characteristic than what Judge
Easterbrook would require. See supra note 264 (discussing the specificity to be
used in alleging the relevant protected characteristic).
315. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).
316. See supra Part IV.
317. See Seiner, supra note 19, at 147; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1056
(discussing the facts necessary to provide a defendant with fair notice of a Title
VII claim).
318. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text (discussing the
differences in jurisdiction on the issue of what constitutes an adverse action).
319. For example, in so-called "reverse discrimination" claims, some
jurisdictions require a plaintiff to provide "background circumstances" showing
why the employer would discriminate against the majority. See generally
Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of
Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L.
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E. Limitations of the Proposed Framework
The unified pleading framework proposed above provides a
valuable tool for litigants and the courts in assessing whether a
plaintiff has adequately stated a Title VII claim for relief. The
proposed framework provides a straightforward, simple model for
evaluating employment-discrimination claims. Nonetheless, like
any framework, the proposed model does have certain limitations
that are worth addressing.
Initially, it should be noted that the proposed model is intended
to address the substantive elements of a Title VII claim (with an
emphasis on adequately pleading discriminatory intent) and does
not address any jurisdictional requirements or prerequisites to filing
suit.3 20 Thus, for example, a plaintiff will likely want to establish
that the employer has the requisite number of employees to be
covered by the statute, 2 ' though such an allegation is beyond the
scope of this Article.
Additionally, the proposed framework applies primarily to
individual claims of intentional employment discrimination. Thus,
the model was not intended for systemic or class-action
discrimination claims, which would require a more complex analysis
of the pleadings.322 Similarly, as the elements of a cause of action for
harassment or retaliation in the employment context are
substantially different from traditional Title VII disparate-
treatment cases, these claims are also beyond the scope of this
Article.323 Moreover, the proposed model set forth above is intended
REV. 1031, 1065-71 (2004). A plaintiff bringing a reverse-discrimination claim
in one of these jurisdictions may want to provide these background
circumstances in the complaint, though doing so would likely not be required at
this early stage of the proceedings. See Seiner, supra note 8 at 1044 n.226
(discussing reverse-discrimination claims); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct.
2658 (2009) (considering a discrimination claim brought by white firefighters).
320. See Seiner, supra note 8, at 1043; Seiner, supra note 19, at 131, 135
n.310.
321. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) ("The term 'employer' means a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person."); see also Seiner,
supra note 19, at 135 n.310, 142 n.350 (discussing the issue of coverage under
the ADA); Seiner, supra note 8, at 1047 n.240 (discussing the issue of coverage
under Title VII).
322. See generally Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class
Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813 (2004) (discussing Title VII class
actions).
323. See, e.g., Harsco Corp. v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007)
("To establish that a sexually hostile work environment existed, a plaintiff must
prove the following elements: (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she
was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex;
and (4) due to the harassment's severity or pervasiveness, the harassment
altered a term, condition, or privilege of the plaintiffs employment and created
an abusive working environment." (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Dick v.
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for intentional-discrimination claims and would not apply to a cause
of action alleging a disparate-impact (unintentional) violation of
Title VII.324  And as the model addresses Title VII claims
exclusively, it is not meant to apply to workplace claims brought
under the ADA3 25 or the ADEA.3 26
Finally, it is worth noting that the proposed framework applies
a minimum standard to Title VII pleading. Thus, navigating
Twombly and Iqbal, the proposed model examines the essential
components of a plausible Title VII claim. Keeping this minimum
standard in mind, however, there is nothing preventing a plaintiff
from alleging additional facts or legal arguments that are above and
beyond the scope of the proposed framework. Indeed, in certain
circumstances and jurisdictions, alleging additional facts may
enhance the plaintiffs overall Title VII case. Nonetheless, plaintiffs
should still be careful not to over allege facts that might lead to the
dismissal of their claims. 27 As Judge Posner has warned in a Title
VII case, a litigant "who files a long and detailed complaint may
plead himself out of court by including factual allegations which if
true show that his legal rights were not invaded.""'
F. The Swierkiewicz Safe Harbor
The proposed pleading framework set forth in this Article
provides a minimum pleading standard for Title VII plaintiffs.
Navigating Twombly and Iqbal-and relying on research
Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2005))); Velez v. Janssen
Ortho, LLC, 467 F.3d 802, 806 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[Cilaims of retaliatory
discrimination under this provision [of Title VII] must begin with a prima facie
showing of three elements: (1) protected opposition activity, (2) an adverse
employment action, and (3) a causal connection between the protected conduct
and the adverse action.").
324. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)
(discussing the disparate-impact theory of discrimination under Title VII and
holding that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices"); see also Seiner,
supra note 19, at 130-31 (discussing the limitations of the ADA pleading
model); Seiner, supra note 8, at 1047, 1050 (discussing the limitations of the
Title VII pleading model). Similarly, the model proposed here is not intended to
evaluate mixed-motive claims brought under Title VII.
325. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006); see Seiner, supra note 19 (arguing for a
unified pleading standard for disability-discrimination claims).
326. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006).
327. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Notice Letters and Notice Pleading: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Sufficiency of Environmental Citizen
Suit Notice, 78 OR. L. REV. 105, 168 (1999) ("Other courts have similarly held
that over-zealous plaintiffs can plead themselves out of court.").
328. Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 1986); see
Seiner, supra note 19, at 130 (noting that the proposed pleading standard for
disability cases is a minimum threshold); Seiner, supra note 8, at 1056 (noting
that the proposed pleading standard for Title VII cases requires only a "bare
minimum of facts").
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demonstrating the continued prevalence of discrimination-the
proposed model establishes which factual elements are critical for
alleging discriminatory intent when asserting a workplace claim.
As already noted, however, plaintiffs are free to assert additional
facts not required by this framework, and there may be some
advantages to doing so.
In this regard, it should be noted that the Swierkiewicz decision
likely provides a safe harbor for employment-discrimination
plaintiffs. As discussed earlier, Swierkiewicz holds that a Title VII
plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination to
survive a motion to dismiss.3 29 If this decision remains good law as
applied to Title VII cases (and I have argued throughout this Article
that the decision is still viable), it follows that a plaintiff who does
successfully plead the prima facie elements of an employment-
discrimination claim should inherently survive a motion to dismiss.
Under the reasoning of Swierkiewicz, any court that requires more
than these prima facie elements at the motion-to-dismiss stage of
the proceedings would be inappropriately applying a "heightened
pleading standard" to the case.so
Under the McDonnell Douglas test discussed earlier, a Title VII
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing
that the plaintiff is part of a protected class, that the plaintiff is
qualified, that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action,
and that there is other evidence giving rise to an inference of
discrimination.ul A plaintiff sufficiently asserting all of these prima
facie elements has alleged more than what is required by
Swierkiewicz332 (or by the proposed pleading model established in
this Article), and that plaintiffs complaint should not be dismissed.
Swierkiewicz, therefore, creates a safe harbor for Title VII
litigants by providing a pleading floor for workplace claims.
Plaintiffs who allege a prima facie case of employment
discrimination have surpassed this floor and should be permitted to
proceed with their case. Courts should not require plaintiffs to
satisfy all of these prima facie elements, but those plaintiffs that do
allege all of these factors should not find their claims subject to
dismissal.
329. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002).
330. Id. at 514-15.
331. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). As noted
earlier, the fourth element of the prima facie case is often established by
showing that "similarly situated employees outside of the protected class
received more favorable treatment." Lucas v. PyraMax Bank, FSB, 539 F.3d
661, 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
332. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-11.
333. See id.
334. As discussed above, the courts should only require that plaintiffs allege
the facts set forth in the proposed analytical pleading framework discussed in
detail in this Article.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED PLEADING FRAMEWORK
The pleading framework set forth above would have many
implications for employment-discrimination litigants.3 The
primary benefit of the proposed approach is that it would bring
simplicity to a complex, confusing process.3 After Twombly and
Iqbal, plaintiffs are left guessing as to what factual content to
include in a complaint, with the only clear guidance being that the
alleged claim must have more than a possible chance of success but
need not rise to the probability level.33' The proposed framework
defines exactly where that line of acceptability should be drawn for
Title VII plaintiffs when pleading discriminatory intent and
provides a simple model for litigants to follow. 33" Thus, the simple,
streamlined approach of the pleading framework would end "the
confusion already faced by the courts and litigants"339 when applying
the plausibility standard to employment-discrimination claims.340
Similarly, the approach offered in this Article would help
prevent needless litigation over what plausibility means when
alleging discriminatory intent.34 ' The vagueness of the plausibility
test provided by Twombly and Iqbal almost assures that this
335. See Seiner, supra note 19, at 145-49 (discussing the implications of
proposed pleading model); Seiner, supra note 8, at 1053-59 (same).
336. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1919, 1932-34 (2009) ("[Twombly], during its short life, has
triggered tremendous confusion in case and commentary. What exactly it
meant is clearly open to dispute, as is the wisdom of imposing, with no
forewarning or public discussion, any sort of plausibility test on pleading.");
Seiner, supra note 19, at 145-49; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1053-59.
337. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2006)) (discussing the possibility/probability
standard).
338. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes,
Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992) (discussing simplicity and
complexity in the legal setting).
339. Seiner, supra note 19, at 98; see also Tice, supra note 67, at 838
("Ultimately, the Court's decision [in Twombly] creates uncertainty among
lower courts and practitioners.").
340. See Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice"
Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 893, 918 (2008) ("Much work remains
for the lower courts and, perhaps the Supreme Court, in fleshing out the
contours of a post-Twombly pleading regime.").
341. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests,
Destabilizing Systems, 95 IowA L. REv. (forthcoming Mar. 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448796 ("[Wie can expect a long period, perhaps a
decade or more, of sorting and jostling before we have even a slightly clearer
idea about what allegations must appear in complaints. Persistent confusion on
such a determinative feature contributes to major destabilization of civil
litigation-destabilization created by the Court's invention of a new and jarring
test, exaggerated by its unclear delivery, and intensified by the poor legal
process followed by the Court.") (manuscript at 32); Seiner, supra note 19, at
146-47; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1055-56.
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standard "will spawn years of increased litigation."4  By clearly
defining what "plausible" means for discriminatory intent in the
Title VII context, the proposed approach would avoid this
unnecessary litigation through an easily applied three-part
framework. Indeed, even if the courts ultimately altered the
framework proposed here, a unified standard would help bring some
definitiveness to the currently confused pleading process for
employment-discrimination claims. 3
One additional noteworthy benefit of the proposed approach is
that it would save significant judicial resources. In addition to
reducing litigation costs as discussed above, the simplicity of the
proposed pleading model would assist courts in evaluating Title VII
claims early in the case.3" Thus, a court could quickly compare a
plaintiffs complaint against the proposed framework and easily
identify and notify the parties of any deficiencies. A complaint that
is still inadequate (even after an opportunity to amend) could be
quickly identified and removed from the court's docket. Similarly, a
unified pleading framework would increase the likelihood that
plaintiffs would file adequate complaints at the beginning of the
case, as these litigants would have a clear standard to follow. As a
result, courts would have to address fewer deficient complaints.
Finally, judicial resources would likely be saved through an
increased number of settlements. A unified standard would create
"[mlore clarity early on in the process," enhancing the probability of
settling these matters "before the expensive discovery process
begins."3" And more settlements would certainly result in a reduced
342. Dodson, supra note 11, at 142; see also Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the
Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us
About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1217, 1239 (2008)
("[Wihile the lower courts may eventually settle on a more moderate
interpretation of the case, it seems hard to dispute that the Court's pleading
jurisprudence is anything but ambiguous.").
343. Cf. Asifa Quraishi, Comment, From a Gasp to a Gamble: A Proposed
Test for Unconscionability, 25 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 187, 205 (1991) ("Ultimately,
litigants in the common law system, and perhaps any legal system, cannot have
absolutely accurate predictability. Some measure of predictability, however, is
desirable, and thus the law must provide some systematic method of analysis.").
See generally Seiner, supra note 8, at 1053-59 (discussing the implications of
the proposed pleading model for employment-discrimination cases).
344. See Schuck, supra note 338, at 34 ("As for judges, simple rules are
easier to administer and generate fewer disputes, an important consideration
for overwhelmed courts."). See also Seiner, supra note 19, at 145-46; Seiner,
supra note 8, at 1055 (discussing how a unified model for pleading employment
discrimination cases would "save judicial resources").
345. Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group
Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 655, 662 ("The more
certain the law-the less the variance in expected outcomes-the more likely
the parties will predict the same outcome from litigation, and the less likely
that litigation will occur because of differences in predicted outcomes.").
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caseload for the judicial system.4
One potential concern over the plausibility standard endorsed
by the Supreme Court is that lower courts can apply the standard
subjectively.34 7 Thus, the recent Supreme Court decisions can be
seen as providing "a blank check for federal judges to get rid of cases
they disfavor."3 " And, in the employment-discrimination context,
recent research suggests that the plausibility test is already being
used by some federal district courts to dismiss workplace claims.39
A uniform pleading model would thus bring some predictability to
pleading Title VII claims50 and prevent courts from unnecessarily
applying a heightened pleading standard to employment-
discrimination cases that should be permitted to proceed.35 ' A
unified test would therefore provide a standard much more objective
than the ambiguous plausibility test,3" hopefully leading to more
353
consistent results in Title VII cases.
Some might argue that the proposed framework creates a
standard too easy to satisfy and would therefore result in an
increased amount of meritless litigation.3 5 While the proposed
standard does simplify the pleading process and may therefore
encourage more individuals to bring suit, the framework does no
more than quantify the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. Thus, to the
346. See Scott J. Connolly, Note, Individual Liability of Supervisors for
Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: Courts' Reliance on the Rules of Statutory
Construction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 421, 453 (2001) ("[In enacting Title VII,
Congress's purpose was to eliminate discriminatory employment practices to
the greatest extent possible using a limited commitment of federal judicial
resources.").
347. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 136, at 11 ("[The Twombly pleading
standard requiring plausibility might be too subjective to yield predictable and
consistent results across cases. Developing a theory that describes the essence
of what the Twombly Court was getting at would thus lend much-needed
precision to the doctrine.").
348. Liptak, supra note 301 (quoting Professor Stephen B. Burbank).
349. See Seiner, supra note 8, at 1014, 1035-38 (discussing a study that
"revealed that the lower courts are unquestionably using the new [Twombly]
plausibility standard to dismiss Title VII claims").
350. See Spencer, supra note 136, at 4.
351. As the Twombly decision notes, "the Court is not requiring heightened
fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007); see
Seiner, supra note 8, at 1054 (noting that a uniform pleading model would help
prevent "the courts from applying too rigid a pleading standard to Title VII
claims").
352. See Spencer, supra note 117, at 160 (referencing Twombly's "amorphous
concept of 'plausibility.'").
353. See Spencer, supra note 136, at 6.
354. See Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism
from Employment: The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 51 (1995)
("Unsuccessful frivolous litigation is expensive for employers and society;
successful frivolous litigation is even more expensive."); see also Seiner, supra
note 19, at 147-49; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1056-57.
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extent that the Supreme Court or federal rules have created a
threshold that is too low for plaintiffs, it is that threshold that
should be reevaluated.355 This Article simply helps to decipher what
the recent Supreme Court decisions mean for employment-
discrimination plaintiffs and where those decisions draw the line for
pleading a Title VII claim.356 It should further be considered that a
streamlined pleading process may also encourage individuals who
have been legitimately discriminated against to bring suit and avail
themselves of their rights under the statute.3 "7 This ease of access to
the judicial system can certainly be viewed as a benefit, as it would
assist individuals in vindicating their civil rights.35
Similarly, some might argue that the proposed framework is
overly rigorous and proposes a standard that is too demanding for
plaintiffs. While it is true that the pleading model suggested in this
Article creates a higher standard than that demanded by Conley v.
Gibson,us Twombly and Iqbal appear to have raised the pleading
bar. 360 The proposed model simply navigates the recent Supreme
Court decisions and offers a framework that comports with the
recently announced plausibility standard. Moreover, this Article
attempts to balance the interests of both parties by suggesting a
framework that is easy for the plaintiff to comply with, while still
providing the defendant with the pertinent information of the
alleged claim. Finally, it should be considered that all of the
information required by the proposed pleading framework should be
within the plaintiffs knowledge when the complaint is filed. To the
extent that some information is lacking, the plaintiff should clearly
355. Elaine M. Korb & Richard A. Bales, A Permanent Stop Sign: Why
Courts Should Yield to the Temptation to Impose Heightened Pleading
Standards in § 1983 Cases, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 267, 293-94 (2002) ("[Allthough
heightened pleading accords courts an operative mechanism for filtering out
unsubstantiated suits, plaintiffs with meritorious claims should not be deprived
of their day in court. The interests of all should not be sacrificed for the benefit
of a few.").
356. See also Steinman, supra note 138 ("it would be a mistake to construe
this [proposed transactional approach] as requiring extensive details about the
acts or events that are alleged to have occurred-e.g., exact dates, times,
locations, or which particular employees or officers of an institutional or
corporate party were involved.") (manuscript at 54).
357. The simplicity of the proposed pleading framework would also help
some litigants recognize that their claims lack merit-thus discouraging these
individuals from bringing a frivolous suit.
358. See generally Frank V. Williams, III, Reinventing the Courts: The
Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the State Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 591,
701-03 (2007) (discussing ease of access to the judicial system).
359. 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
360. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63 (2007)
(abrogating Conley v. Gibson); see also Spencer, supra note 41, at 494
("Ultimately, Twombly raises the pleading bar to a point where it will inevitably
screen out claims that could have been proven if given the chance."). See
generally Seiner, supra note 19, at 148; Seiner, supra note 8, at 1056.
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indicate this in the pleadings and a court should take a liberal
approach to the missing information, perhaps even permitting
limited discovery on the particular issue. 6
In summary, the simplicity of the proposed pleading standard
outlined in this Article offers a number of benefits for the entire
judicial system. Though there are obvious concerns with
implementing any new legal framework, a unified model would
greatly assist the courts in evaluating Title VII claims and would
prevent needless litigation by defining a previously vague
plausibility standard.362
CONCLUSION
Twombly and Iqbal have replaced a relaxed pleading standard
with a more complex and undefined plausibility test. 313
Employment-discrimination plaintiffs, who are already confronted
with an uphill battle when attempting to establish intent, are now
faced with an even more daunting task. Iqbal creates an arduous
burden for Title VII plaintiffs by mandating that allegations of
discriminatory intent cannot be general or conclusory and must be
made with the proper factual support.'6 This Article attempts to
ease the pleading burden for Title VII litigants by clarifying the
recent Supreme Court decisions and by defining what plausibility
means when alleging discriminatory intent. The analytical
framework proposed by this Article will help ensure that Title VII
plaintiffs frame their allegations in the proper factual context. As
the studies outlined in this Article demonstrate, employment
discrimination continues to be a very real threat in our society. A
Title VII plaintiff should therefore be given a fair opportunity to
have her discrimination claim heard, without the fear of making an
inadvertent procedural misstep which would prematurely end the
365
case.
"If you judge people you have no time to love them."36' A model
pleading standard for Title VII claims will help prevent individuals
361. See Spencer, supra note 41, at 494 ("The new plausibility
standard . .. bodes ill for plaintiffs who will now have to muster facts showing
plausibility when such facts may be unavailable to them.").
362. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 341, at 50 ("Our point is simple:
Twombly and Iqbal have introduced a wild card, a factor of substantial
instability, at the threshold stage of civil process.").
363. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-51 (2009); Twombly, 550
U.S. at 562-64.
364. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
365. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("'The
Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that
the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.'" (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957))).
366. Mary Beth Young, Learning to Discern Rather Than Judge, NAT'L CATH.
REP., March 11, 2005, at 14.
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from being inappropriately judged in the workplace on the basis of
their gender, religion, and national origin, or by the color of their
skin. The time for that model pleading standard is now-after
Iqbal.
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